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ABSTRACT
This Article presents a first-of-its-kind analysis of the disciplinary functions
of state medical licensing boards-the frequently overlooked administrative
agencies designed to serve as the "gatekeepers" of the medical profession. It
concludes that medical boards may have lost sight of their primary goal of patient
protection and suggests that a renewed focus on professional licensing boards may
go a long way towards addressing some of the quality of care problems plaguing
the American medical system.
This Article identifies three fundamental legal principles underlying medical
boards' authority to discipline physicians: the goal of public protection, substantive
due process limitations based on fitness to practice medicine, and the concept of
disciplinary minimalism. It demonstrates that boards, which frequently sanction
physicians who engage in criminal conduct and other forms of "unprofessional
conduct" outside the clinical sphere, often exercise their disciplinary discretion in a
manner inconsistent with these fundamental principles. A more effective use of
medical boards' scarce resources would involve a focus on physicians whose
misconduct is more clearly linked to clinical practice. Accordingly, this Article
suggests that boards return their focus to the principles of professional discipline,
prioritizing disciplinary actions taken on the basis of competence, rather than
character.
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INTRODUCTION
State medical boards are designed to play a significant role in ensuring
medical quality.' As the state agencies responsible for the licensure and discipline
of physicians, medical boards serve as the gatekeepers of the medical profession.
However, critics frequently question whether boards have, in fact, been living up to
their potential in this regard, particularly in the context of professional discipline.2
Since the 1970s, state medical boards have faced criticism from a variety of sources
for inappropriately screening applicants for medical licensure, 3 failing to discipline
I. See Robert C. Derbyshire, How Effective Is Medical Self-Regulation?, 7 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
193, 193 (1983) (explaining that state licensing boards are generally responsible for disciplining
physicians under the police powers of the state); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Oversight of the Quality of
Medical Care: Regulation, Management, or the Market?, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 825, 826 (1995) ("The task
of quality oversight has long been assigned in the first instance to the regulatory boards that license and
discipline health care professionals,").
2. See, e.g., Timothy S. Jost et al., Consumers, Complaints, and Professional Discipline: A Look
at Medical Licensure Boards, 3 HEALTH MATRIx 309, 332 (1993) ("Despite a general belief that
medical licensure boards should play a major role in assuring the clinical competence of physicians, it is
clear from our data that most disciplinary actions do not focus directly on issues of clinical
competence.").
3. See Marc T. Law & Zeynep K. Hansen, Medical Licensing Board Characteristics and
Physician Discipline: An Empirical Analysis, 35 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 63, 66 (2010) ("[A]fter
lawsuits for medical malpractice became more common in the 1970s, it became increasingly clear that
physicians, in remaining inactive and silent, had failed to police and discipline their colleagues."); Sarah
J. Polfliet, A National Analysis of Medical Licensure Applications, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L.
369, 369, 372-73 (2008) (suggesting that state medical boards' omission of questions on initial licensure
applications and licensure renewal applications regarding mental illness and substance use, so as to
comply with the Americans with Disability Act of 1990, leaves their duty to protect the public
unfulfilled).
[VOL. 13:285
THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL DISCIPLINE
dangerous physicians, 4 and generally being lax in their oversight duties at the
expense of a vulnerable public. 5 Whatever the reason for these alleged failures,
medical boards only take disciplinary action against less than one-half of one
percent of physicians annually 6 -not often enough, critics argue, to have a
significant impact on professional quality.7
While there is likely some element of truth to the argument that medical
boards discipline physicians too infrequently, this Article identifies a more
substantive problem-namely, that when boards do choose to exercise their
disciplinary discretion, they often focus on character-related misconduct, including
criminal misconduct, that bears only a tangential relation to clinical quality and
patient care. Consider, for example, a Nevada board's recent decision to discipline
a chiropractor for unprofessional conduct after he was convicted of involuntary
4. See generally Derbyshire, supra note 1, at 197. Derbyshire indicates that between 1963 and
1972, roughly 0.06% of physicians in the United States were disciplined per year, and that in 1981,
disciplinary actions against only 0.14% of all licensed physicians were reported to the Federation of
State Medical Boards. Id. In comparison, Derbyshire estimates that 5% of all physicians in the United
States are incompetent and unscrupulous. Id.
5. See, e.g., Arnold S. Relman, Editorial, Professional Regulation and the State Medical Boards,
312 NEW ENG. J. MED. 784, 785 (1985) ("All the evidence suggests ... that most if not all the states
have been too lax-not too strict-in their enforcement of medical professional standards."); Doug J.
Swanson, Drug Past, Discipline Didn't Stop Doctor; State Board Took Years to Revoke License,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 1, 2001, at IA (explaining how the Texas State Board of Medical
Examiners allowed a doctor to continue practicing medicine and performing surgeries despite evidence
of cocaine use by the doctor); Cheryl W. Thompson, D.C. Board Rarely Punishes Physicians, WASH.
POST, Apr. 11, 2005, at AI (noting deficiencies in oversight by the District of Columbia medical board
between 1999 and 2004).
6. See Sidney M. Wolfe & Kate Resnevic, Public Citizen's Health Research Group Ranking of the
Rate of State Medical Boards' Serious Disciplinary Actions, 2005-2007 (2008), available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/medicalboardtable.pdf (explaining that in 2007, states initiated an
average ofjust 2.92 serious disciplinary actions per 1,000 physicians).
7. Economists, in particular, have long made similar arguments, questioning the value of licensure
and self-regulation in highly insulated and self-protective professions, like medicine. These authors and
others suggest that medical quality and patient safety could be better safeguarded through market-based
solutions that close the information gap between physicians and consumers. See generally Charles H.
Baron, Licensure of Health Care Professionals: The Consumer's Case for Abolition, 9 AM. J.L. & MED.
335 (1983) (criticizing medical licensure practices as both raising health care costs and failing to protect
consumers); Walter Gellhom, The Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 16-18, 22, 25
(1976) (arguing that occupational licensing impedes access to needed services and serves only to protect
those who have already been licensed, rather than protect the public from incompetent professionals);
Anthony Ogus, Rethinking Self-Regulation, 15 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 97 (1995) (offering general
criticism of the self-regulatory model); Shirley V. Svorny, Physician Licensure: A New Approach to
Examining the Role of Professional Interests, 25 ECON. INQUIRY 497 (1987). While some steps have
been taken in this direction, it is highly unlikely that the current system of medical licensure would be
abandoned in the foreseeable future. See, e.g., Massachusetts Board of Registration in Medicine,
http://profiles.massmedboard.org (last visited June 4, 2010) (allowing patients to search for physician
profiles, including malpractice payments made in the past ten years). Accordingly, this Article does not
pursue alternatives to medical licensure and discipline as a means to protecting patient health, but rather
evaluates realistic improvements that might be made to the existing system.
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manslaughter for shoving a man at a car wash.8 In recent years, medical providers
have been disciplined on grounds as varied as tax fraud,9 failure to facilitate review
of child support obligations,' l soliciting sex in a public restroom," possession of
marijuana for personal use,' 2 and reckless driving involving alcohol, 3 as well as
other conduct allegedly bringing the medical profession into disrepute.' 4 While
these are not commendable activities by any stretch of the imagination, this Article
questions whether, in light of the traditional goals of professional discipline,
sanctioning physicians on these grounds (as opposed to grounds more clearly
linked to clinical practice) is the most effective or efficient use of medical boards'
resources.
Part I of this Article traces the development of the modem medical
disciplinary system, and looks to the constitutional underpinnings of medical board
authority to identify three fundamental principles of professional discipline in
American law. 15 In Part II, I argue that medical boards may be acting in a manner
inconsistent with these fundamental legal principles when they pursue disciplinary
action against physicians for character-related misconduct outside the clinical
sphere.' 6 I also challenge some of the traditional justifications that have been
offered in support of professional discipline for character-related misconduct 7 and
8. Annette Wells, Board Finds Chiropractor Guilty of Unprofessional Conduct, LAS VEGAS
REVIEW-JOURNAL, Dec. 16, 2007, at I B. The board revoked the chiropractor's license, but stayed the
revocation for four and a half years (the time remaining in his felony probation). Id.
9. See, e.g., Windham v. Bd. of Med. Quality Assurance, 163 Cal. Rptr. 566, 567-58, 573 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1980) (upholding medical board's imposition of discipline on physician for tax evasion); In re
Kindschi, 319 P.2d 824, 827 (Wash. 1958) (upholding suspension of physician's license as a result of
his guilty plea in a tax evasion case against him).
10. See, e.g., Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1032-33 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that
California's requirement that professional licensees disclose their social security numbers so that the
state can determine if they failed to pay child support does not violate due process because being current
in child support and tax obligations is an element of moral character and therefore related to fitness to
practice).
11. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 111 Cal. Rptr. 353, 354 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973)
(disciplining a physician for soliciting a male adult to engage in a lewd or dissolute act).
12. See, e.g., Weissbuch v. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 116 Cal. Rptr. 479, 480-81 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974)
(sentencing a physician to two years probation and suspended license revocation for pleading guilty to
marijuana possession).
13. See, e.g., Griffiths v. Super, Ct., 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 445, 449-51 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (upholding
a medical board's order that a physician's license be revoked, stayed pending conditional three year
probation, for unprofessional conduct stemming from multiple misdemeanor convictions involving the
consumption of alcohol as a result of a number of drunk driving arrests).
14. See, e.g., Foster v. Bd. of Med. Quality Assurance, 278 Cal. Rptr 117, 118-19 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991) (affirming the board's ninety-day suspension of a physician's medical license for unprofessional
conduct after physician created a non-existent insurance company and claimed to have taken out a
medical malpractice policy from this company).
15. See infra Part I.
16. See infra Part II.A.
17. See infra Part II.B.
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posit a few possible explanations for why boards may choose to pursue these kinds
of disciplinary actions.' 8 Finally, this Article concludes by explaining how medical
boards and society might benefit by applying a principles-based analysis in
determining when professional discipline is appropriate.
I. PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE IN AMERICAN LAW
This Part describes the legal underpinnings of the current American system of
medical licensure and discipline, 19 traces its historical development, 20 and briefly
describes how the system currently operates in practice and the challenges that have
been raised against it.2' More importantly, this Part highlights three very important
insights about the normative goals of the medical disciplinary system that can be
derived from the constitutional justifications for professional licensure and
discipline.22
A. Medical Board Authority: History and Practice
Among the unenumerated powers reserved to each state under the Tenth
Amendment is the power to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its citizenry,
commonly known as the police power.23 As explained by the Supreme Court in
24Dent v. West Virginia, it is "[t]he power of the State to provide for the general
welfare of its people [that] authorizes it to prescribe all such regulations as, in its
judgment, will secure or tend to secure them against the consequences of ignorance
and incapacity as well as of deception and fraud. 25 It is pursuant to their police
powers that states are authorized to regulate law, medicine, and other professions,
which they typically do by delegating authority to professional licensing boards.26
18. See infra Part II.C.
19. See infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 31-62 and accompanying text.
22. See infra Part ll.B.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. X; Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 62 (1872) (describing
the police power as extending "to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all
persons, and the protection of all property within the State").
24. 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
25. Id. at 122.
26. See D. Benjamin Barros, The Police Power and the Takings Clause, 58 U. MIAMI L. REv. 471,
477 (2004) (describing the modem view of the police power as primarily a regulatory power); Lawrence
0. Gostin, A Theory and Definition of Public Health Law, 10 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 1, 2-3, 5
(2007) (explaining that the power and duty of safeguarding public health has generally been the role of
government because public health is the kind of good that can only be achieved through collective
action, which only a government is able to carry out); Edward P. Richards, The Police Power and the
Regulation of Medical Practice: A Historical Review and Guide for Medical Licensing Board
Regulation of Physicians in ERISA-Qualified Managed Care Organizations, 8 ANNALS HEALTH L. 201,
201 (1999) (explaining that states have broad power to regulate medical practice through their police
power, and have delegated this power to medical licensing boards).
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As a constitutional grant of authority, this story is a relatively simple one; for
those familiar with the history of medical licensure, however, it is much more
complex. The first state medical boards were created in the late 1800s when private
medical associations pushed state legislators to adopt laws regulating the practice
of medicine.27 These efforts were driven by physicians who, fearful of incursions
on their territory by "irregulars" and "quacks", were convinced that well-drafted
legislation-far from being self-defeating---could serve an important role in
protecting their professional interests.28 Though some historians suggest that
professional self-protection, rather than concern for patient safety, was the driving
force behind these lobbying efforts,29 the medical practice acts that resulted were,
as a matter of law, clearly adopted pursuant to the legislative authority to protect
public health and safety.3 °
At a minimum, modem medical practice acts define the practice of
medicine,31 establish the requirements for medical licensure, 32 and set forth
procedures for disciplinary action against licensees.33 Medical practice acts also
establish the composition of the state boards of medicine-the administrative
agencies responsible for implementing and enforcing an act's provisions through its
rulemaking and adjudicative powers.34 Modem medical boards generally include
27. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 102-06 (1982); Ronald
L. Akers, The Professional Association and the Legal Regulation of Practice, 2 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 463,
465 (1968).
28. See Akers, supra note 27, at 465-66 (noting that use of state regulation often arose to drive out
"the undesirable practitioner").
29. See, e.g., Stanley J. Gross, The Myth of Professional Licensing, 33 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009,
1011 (1978) (arguing that medical professionals turned toward government for regulation in order "to
secure public confidence and a monopoly of skill").
30. See In re Kindschi, 319 P.2d 824, 827 (Wash. 1958) (analyzing professional disciplinary
proceedings through the lens of the protection of the public).
31. E.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6521 (McKinney 2001) (defining the practice of medicine); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 90-1.1(5) (2009) (defining the practice of medicine and surgery); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-6-204
(2004 & Supp. 2009) (defining the practice of medicine).
32. E.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6524 (McKinney 2001 & Supp. 2010) (listing the requirements for a
physician license) (McKinney 2001 & Supp. 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-67-302 (2007 & Supp.
2009) (listing the qualifications for licensure of physicians and surgeons); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,
§ 1396 (2006) (defining the standard of requirements for admission to practice of medicine).
33. E.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6530 (defining professional misconduct); see generally FED'N OF
STATE MED. BDS., A GUIDE TO THE ESSENTIALS OF A MODERN MEDICAL AND OSTEOPATHIC PRACTICE
ACT §§ IX-X (12th ed. 2009), available at http://www.fsmb.org/pdf/GRPOL_essentials.pdf (describing
disciplinary actions against licensees and procedures for enforcement).
34. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 147.01 (2005) (describing the Board of Medical Practice); N.Y.
EDUC. LAW § 6523 (McKinney 2001) (describing the State Board for Medicine); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,
§ 1351 (describing the Board of Medical Practice); see also Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165, 170 (1923)
(holding that the delegation of professional regulatory powers to an administrative board is consistent
with the U.S. Constitution). See generally FED'N OF STATE MED. BDS., supra note 33, § III (providing
an overview of state medical boards); FED'N OF STATE MED. BDS., ELEMENTS OF A MODERN STATE
MEDICAL AND OSTEOPATHIC BOARD § II (2009), available at http://www.fsmb.org/pdf/
GRPOLElementsModemMedicalBoard.pdf (discussing state medical boards in detail).
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some public members but are dominated by physicians appointed by the
governor.
35
American licensure laws are exclusive in that they grant qualified individuals
the right to engage in the lawful practice of medicine and prohibit the practice of
medicine by unlicensed persons.36 The requirements for obtaining a medical license
are relatively consistent from state to state-generally, the applicant must be a
graduate of an approved medical school, have completed at least one year of an
approved graduate medical education program (residency or fellowship), and have
passed the United States Medical Licensing Examination (USMLE).37 Beyond
imposing educational and training requirements, many medical practice acts also
require that applicants for medical licensure demonstrate good moral character.
38
35. See CARL F. AMERINGER, STATE MEDICAL BOARDS AND THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC PROTECTION
48-51 (1999) (describing trends in state medical boards in the late 1900s); M. Christine Cagle et al.,
Privatizing Professional Licensing Boards: Self-Governance or Self-Interest?, 30 ADMIN. & SOC'Y 734,
750-51 (1999) ("With the exception of Rhode Island, most medical boards in the United States are
primarily composed of physicians."); Eleanor Kinney, Administrative Law Issues in Professional
Regulation, in REGULATION OF THE HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONS 103, 106 (Timothy S. Jost ed., 1997)
("In most states, licensure boards are composed chiefly of members of the regulated profession who are
appointed by the governor.").
36. See, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 6512-6513 (defining the unauthorized practice of a profession
and the unauthorized use of a professional title as crimes). Contrast exclusive licensing laws with
certification laws, which grant qualified individuals the right to use the title of physician in connection
with their practice of medicine and are exclusive only with respect to the use of that title, not with
respect to medical practice generally. Also contrast licensing laws with registration laws, which require
that medical practitioners register their names with a state agency, but impose no qualification
requirements or restrictions on practice. See generally ROBERT L. HOLLINGS & CHRISTAL PiKE-NASE,
PROFESSIONAL AND OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ANNOTATED
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND PROFESSIONAL RESOURCE, at xvii-xviii (1997) (explaining that licensing is the
most restrictive form of regulation and quoting the view that licensing allows a practitioner to perform
acts that would otherwise be illegal). For scholarly criticisms of exclusive licensure, see ELIOT
FREIDSON, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF APPLIED KNOWLEDGE 23-24
(1970) (explaining the political nature of the medical profession's autonomy, and pointing out that the
profession's dependence on the state in granting it this autonomy may actually lessen its autonomy);
Harris S. Cohen, On Professional Power and Conflict of Interest: State Licensing Boards on Trial, 5 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 291, 291-306 (1980) (arguing that fundamental change is needed to the
medical licensing board model); Gellhom, supra note 7, at 12 (noting that the restrictions imposed by
licensing boards are achieved mostly by making entry into the profession expensive both in time and
money); Gross, supra note 29, at 1011-12 (explaining that though modem professionals conceal their
commercial interests in the area of occupational boards, they are apparent through the boards' restrictive
procedures); supra note 7.
37. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-10 (West 2008) (defining the qualification for
licensure); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1720 (2005 & Supp. 2008) (listing the certification requirements
to practice medicine); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6524 (McKinney 2001 & Supp. 2010) (defining the
requirements to obtain a professional license). For a detailed comparison of state requirements, see
generally AM. MED. ASS'N, STATE MEDICAL LICENSURE REQUIREMENTS AND STATISTICS 2007, at 22-
24, 80-87 (2007) [hereinafter AMA LICENSURE REQUIREMENTS].
38. E.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6524(7). See generally Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 191 & n. 1
(1898) (explaining that states may require good character as a prerequisite for allowing an individual to
practice medicine and listing numerous jurisdictions with such requirements); AMA LICENSURE
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Some states also impose additional requirements, such as proof of malpractice
insurance coverage; 39 a clear criminal background check;
40 or age,41 citizenship, 42
or residency requirements.43
Medical boards' ongoing duties include periodic re-registration of licensees,
which is typically contingent on completion of specified hours of Continuing
Medical Education training. 44 However, medical boards rarely impose additional
requirements intended to ensure the quality of care, such as mandatory
recertification or random practice audits, upon physicians who have already
received their licenses. 45 As a result, the most important of state medical boards'
oversight responsibilities with respect to medical quality is the discipline of
professional licensees.
The medical disciplinary process is generally reactive, rather than proactive.46
It begins when a member of the public files a complaint, or, in the case of
discipline on the grounds of criminal or civil liability, when a court or law
enforcement agency files a report with the medical board. 47 The board screens, and,
REQUIREMENTS, supra note 37 (documenting the various state medical licensure requirements);
COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS'N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS OF THE
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION § 10.015, at 348 (2008-2009 ed. 2008) ("The practice of medicine
... is fundamentally a moral activity that arises from the imperative to care for patients and to alleviate
suffering.").
39. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.320 (West 2001) (requiring proof of malpractice liability
protection).
40. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-47-36 (Supp. 2009); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 155.008 (Vernon 2004
& Supp. 2009).
41. Eg., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9-6 (West 2004); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6524(5).
42. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9-6; N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6524(6). But see In re Griffiths, 413 U.S.
717, 718, 729 (1973) (finding unconstitutional a Connecticut rule requiring bar applicants to be United
States citizens).
43. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 43-34-26(a)(3) (Supp. 2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-67-302(1)(f)
(2007 & Supp. 2009).
44. See AMA LICENSURE REQUIREMENTS, supra note 37, at 48 (discussing re-registration
requirements).
45. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUB. NO. OEI-01-
93-00020, FEDERAL INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE STATE MEDICAL BOARDS' PERFORMANCE 5 (1993),
available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-0l-93-00020.pdf [hereinafter FEBRUARY 1993 OIG
REPORT] (proposing that state medical boards take a more proactive role in assessing and assuring the
quality of medical care after initial licensure examinations).
46. See RANDALL R. BOVBJERG ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., STATE
DISCIPLINE OF PHYSICIANS: ASSESSING STATE MEDICAL BOARDS THROUGH CASE STUDIES 33, 44-45
(2006) (discussing the reactive nature of medical licensing boards).
47. See RICHARD P. KUSSEROW, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUB. NO. OEI-01-89-
00560, STATE MEDICAL BOARDS AND MEDICAL DISCIPLINE (1990), available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-89-00560.pdf [hereinafter 1990 OIG REPORT] ("State medical
boards rely primarily on referrals or complaints to identify cases for investigation."); Jost et al., supra
note 2, at 310-11 (discussing how the disciplinary process generally begins). Many of these reports are
also filed with the National Practitioner Data Bank, a resource maintained by the Department of Health
and Human Services that provides medical boards, hospitals, and "other health care entities with
information relating to the professional competence and conduct" of licensed medical professionals.
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if appropriate, investigates the complaint; if the board finds the complaint is valid,
it may exercise its discretion to pursue disciplinary action against the physician,48
which can range from oral or written reprimand to license revocation or
suspension.49
Although the substantive grounds for professional discipline vary from state
to state, most state medical practice acts authorize discipline for gross
incompetence, physical or mental impairment, alcohol or drug abuse, practicing
without a license or aiding the unlicensed practice of medicine,50 as well as
reciprocal discipline against those providers who have been subject to disciplinary
action in other states. 51 Moreover, most states authorize discipline under a broad
category of "unprofessional conduct," which may include violations of codes of
medical ethics, 52 conduct that brings the medical profession into disrepute,53 or
other unspecified forms of "dishonorable conduct," including criminal acts
(typically felonies or crimes of "moral turpitude").54 Because states have broad
latitude in determining how best to exercise their police powers, and because the
loss of a medical license does not implicate a fundamental right, rational basis
review is applied when evaluating the constitutionality of such statutes.55
Given that medical boards are state agencies, their authority is subject to
traditional constitutional constraints, including equal protection and procedural due
process limitations. 56 Most importantly, however, medical board disciplinary
proceedings are constrained by principles of substantive due process, which limit
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUB. No. OEI-01-90-00523,
NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK: USEFULNESS AND IMPACT OF REPORTS TO STATE LICENSING
BOARDS, at i (1993), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-90-00523.pdf.
48. Jost et al., supra note 2, at 326-30.
49. Id. at 330.
50. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 3-20 (2d ed. 2000).
51. See RICHARD P. KUSSEROW, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUB. NO. OEI-01-89-
00562, STATE MEDICAL BOARDS AND MEDICAL DISCIPLINE: A STATE BY STATE REVIEW 14 tbl.9
(1990), available at http://www.oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-89-00562.pdf (listing states that have
reciprocity provisions concerning disciplinary actions taken by the states' medical boards).
52. Kenneth Baum, "To Comfort Always": Physician Participation in Executions, 5 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 47, 72 (2001) (noting that many states link "unprofessional conduct" to violations
of prevailing medical ethical norms).
53. E.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 311.597(4) (West 2006).
54. See, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6530(9), (20) (McKinney 2001 & Supp. 2010) (explaining that
unprofessional conduct includes "[b]eing convicted of committing an act constituting a crime" and
"[c]onduct in the practice of medicine [that] evidences moral unfitness to practice medicine").
55. See generally Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955) ("[A] law
need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there
is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a
rational way to correct it.").
56. See, e.g., Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975) ("[A] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic
requirement of due process. This applies to administrative agencies [that] adjudicate as well as to
courts." (citation omitted)).
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the grounds upon which professional discipline can legitimately be imposed.5 7 In
foundational cases such as Dent and Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,58 the
Supreme Court held that the criteria for licensure and discipline may not be vague,
arbitrary, or unattainable, 59 and "must have a rational connection with the
applicant's fitness or capacity to practice" his profession. 60 However, because no
fundamental rights are implicated in the loss of a professional license,61 courts
review boards' disciplinary determinations under a highly deferential standard. 2
B. Three Fundamental Principles of Professional Discipline
As straightforward as it may appear, this simple constitutional requirement-
that the grounds for professional discipline be rationally related to an individual's
fitness or capacity to practice a profession-actually provides three very important
insights about the fundamental goals of professional discipline. Although, as
demonstrated in Part II, these goals may not be reflected in medical boards' current
57. The liberty component of the due process clause includes a right to choose one's field of
employment, and medical licensure is thus considered a kind of property right. See Dent v. West
Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121-22 (1889) (explaining that the right to choose one's profession "is often of
great value to the possessors, and cannot be arbitrarily taken from them, any more than their real or
personal property can be thus taken").
58. Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
59. See id. at 248-49 ("Refusal to allow a man to qualify himself for the profession on a wholly
arbitrary standard or on a consideration that offends the dictates of reason offends the Due Process
Clause.").
60. Id. at 239. The Court in Dent stated:
The nature and extent of the qualifications required must depend primarily upon the
judgment of the State as to their necessity. If they are appropriate to the calling or profession,
and attainable by reasonable study or application, no objection to their validity can be raised
because of their stringency or difficulty. It is only when they have no relation to such calling
or profession, or are unattainable by such reasonable study and application, that they can
operate to deprive one of his right to pursue a lawful vocation.
129 U.S. at 122.
61. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955) (applying a rational
basis standard to an Oklahoma business law).
62. Justice Frankfurter stated in a dissenting opinion in Barsky v. Bd. of Regents:
Reliance on the good faith of a State agency entrusted with the enforcement of appropriate
standards for the practice of medicine is not in itself an investiture of arbitrary power
offensive to due process. Likewise there is nothing in the United States Constitution [that]
requires a State to provide for judicial review of the action of such agencies. Finally, when a
State does establish some sort of judicial review, it can certainly provide that there be no
review of an agency's discretion, so long as that discretion was exercised within the gamut of
choices, however extensive, relevant to the purpose of the power given the administrative
agency.
347 U.S. 442, 470 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also Bettencourt v. Bd. of Registration in
Med., 904 F.2d 772, 774 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court may
overturn a decision of the state medical board only if the agency's decision exceeds statutory authority,
is based on an error of law, or is arbitrary or capricious, among other reasons); Kinney, supra note 35, at
114 ("[B]oth state and federal courts have accorded the decisions of state licensure boards considerable
deference....").
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practice, they form the normative foundations of professional regulatory powers
under American law and, as such, ought to guide boards in determining when to
exercise their disciplinary discretion.
First, the constitutional fitness to practice requirement indicates that the
primary goal of (and justification for) professional discipline is public protection.
As an extension of the state's police power, the medical board's disciplinary
authority is aimed at protecting medical consumers from the harms they may incur
at the hands of incompetent or dishonest physicians.63 This is reflected in the
sanctions that may be imposed on physicians, which range from alerting the
medical board and community of a potential for harm (via a public letter of
reprimand) to withdrawing the physician's right to practice (delicensure). 64 Unlike
criminal law, which is aimed at punishing wrongdoers, or civil law, which is aimed
at victim compensation,65 professional discipline seeks to protect public welfare by
incapacitating or rehabilitating dangerous physicians.
Second, the existence of a constitutional fitness to practice requirement gives
us an important insight into the substantive boundaries of professional discipline-
namely, that there are such boundaries. That is, if it is to serve as a meaningful
limitation on medical board authority, the substantive due process requirement that
the criteria for licensure and discipline be rationally related to the practice of
medicine necessarily implies that there are at least some criteria that do not satisfy
this standard. For example, while requiring that physicians counsel their patients
about the importance of voting in local and national elections would likely further
the public good, it is not clear that this would be a proper subject for medical
licensure or discipline, because it bears no clear connection to the competent
66practice of medicine. As a matter of practice, the dominance of physicians in the
63. See Baron, supra note 7, at 339 (discussing that the primary aim of medical boards is to protect
consumers).
64. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-95-704(c)(1) (Supp. 2009) (allowing a variety of incremental
sanctions to apply, in lieu of a finding of gross and ignorant malpractice); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 2233 (West 2003 & Supp. 2010) (allowing a medical board to issue a public letter of reprimand rather
than filing or prosecuting a formal accusation).
65. See Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42
AM. U. L. REv. 1393, 1394 (1993) (distinguishing between criminal and civil law by pointing out that
"civil law provides victims with compensation, while criminal law inflicts punishment on wrongdoers").
66. Under even a relatively uncontroversial account, the "competent practice of medicine" is
dependent on a physician's education, training, and character. This kind of definition provides that an
individual will be deemed fit to practice medicine if he possesses the basic qualities needed to practice
in a manner that does not cause harm to his patients. At a minimum, he must possess: (a) scientific
knowledge of the human body and its functions, obtained by way of education; (b) the practical skill to
implement this knowledge safely, obtained by way of a residency, fellowship, or other hands-on
experience, as well as the physical ability to do so; and (c) the moral reasoning needed to understand
that his medical knowledge and experience should not be used to harm patients. In effect, fitness to
practice is best understood as a "toolkit" of basic skills that each professional must have before he
begins practicing. Many states have included aspects of the "competent practice of medicine" directly in
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composition of state medical boards tends to support this understanding.67 That is,
in relying on administrative boards dominated by physicians for the
implementation and enforcement of licensure and discipline laws, the American
system implicitly recognizes that professional members are better situated to
evaluate the unique question of fitness to practice; a board composed of laypeople
would have much greater difficulty evaluating, for example, whether a licensed
physician's practice is consistent with the standard of care in his medical
community.
6s
The reason it is necessary to highlight this apparently obvious point is
because it is one that is all too easy to miss when reviewing the case law
surrounding professional discipline.69 When physicians appeal the disciplinary
decisions made by state medical boards, the reviewing courts typically
acknowledge the substantive due process limitations on professional discipline, but
rarely, if ever, reverse the boards' decisions on these grounds.70 This should come
as no surprise, given that the standard of review in these cases is the highly
deferential rational basis test-surely, the state can identify some rational
connection between almost any kind of physician misconduct and the safe and
effective practice of medicine. However, just because a category of professional
discipline is not constitutionally prohibited does not mean that it is an optimal
71
category for the board to pursue.
A final, and related, insight that can be gleaned from the constitutional
limitations on professional discipline is one of scale, rather than substance. That is,
professional licensure and discipline standards are established to ensure a minimal
level of competence, rather than to identify aspirational standards of professional
conduct. This principle of disciplinary minimalism is reflected in the fact that
American law identifies the professional license as a property right requiring
72procedural due process protections, and also in the constitutional requirement that
their statutes. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 25-22.5-3-1 (2007) (enumerating the minimum requirements
of education and scientific knowledge, skill gained in residency, and moral aptitude).
67. See Gail B. Agrawal, Resuscitating Professionalism: Self-Regulation in the Medical
Marketplace, 66 Mo. L. REv. 341, 379-80 n.169 (2001) (noting that while modem state medical boards
frequently include lay members, physicians still tend to comprise a majority); Cagle et al., supra note
35, at 750 (noting that state medical boards are dominated by physicians).
68. See Wesley M. Oliver, A Round Peg in a Square Hole: Federal Forfeiture of State Professional
Licenses, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 179, 189 (2001) (arguing that the members of the Board of Medical
Examiners who are medical professionals are specially suited to determine standards of care and
appropriate sanctions).
69. See infra Part l.C.
70. See infra pp. 317-20.
71. See infra Part ll.B.
72. See, e.g., Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957) ("A State cannot
exclude a person from the practice of law or from any other occupation in a manner or for reasons that
contravene the Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."); Mishler v.
Nev. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 896 F.2d 408, 409-10 (9th Cir. 1990) ("That a professional license is
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the standards for licensure and discipline be "reasonably attainable. 73 As a
practical matter, licensure requirements are aimed at improving the quality of
medical care and, in turn, public health. Accordingly, they are bounded by the
recognition that overly aspirational or stringent licensure laws may have the
counterintuitive effect of actually decreasing public health, as compared to a purely
free-market system, if they too severely limit the number of licensed physicians
available to serve the community's health needs.74
The appropriate view of professional licensure, then, is as a floor beyond
which practitioners may not drop, rather than an ideal towards which they must
strive. In other words, though we view a medical license as evidence that a
physician possesses the basic tools necessary to practice medicine safely, the
license does not ensure that he will actually use these tools correctly going
forward.75 Moreover, a medical license does not distinguish the merely competent
provider from the excellent provider-that distinction takes place at the
marketplace level. For example, private professional associations, like the
American Medical Association (AMA), can (and do) set highly aspirational
standards of practice and professionalism for their members.76 Patients have a
variety of resources at their fingertips to assist them in selecting and evaluating
medical providers from among those that have been deemed competent by the state
and are free to choose their providers based on any number of factors that bear no
relation to fitness to practice (e.g., age, gender, race, or hospital affiliation).77
property and is protected by the Constitution is recognized by both Nevada law.., and by federal law."
(citations omitted)).
73. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889) ("If [the nature and extent of the
qualifications] are appropriate to the calling or profession, and attainable by reasonable study or
application, no objection to their validity can be raised because of their stringency or difficulty.").
74. See generally Frances H. Miller, Medical Discipline in the Twenty-First Century: Are
Purchasers the Answer?, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 36-40 (1997) (explaining how the current
market-driven health care system requires that purchasers have access to good information and a
meaningful choice of providers in order to succeed).
75. Professional discipline, of course, is aimed at addressing this issue.
76. See generally Am. Med. Ass'n, Principles of Medical Ethics, available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/principles-medical-
ethics.shtml. Note, however, that although the standards of ethics and practice set by the AMA are
merely advisory, some of these standards may have a legal impact. Many state medical practice acts that
authorize board discipline of physicians who engage in "unprofessional conduct" or violate "ethical
norms" actually define these terms in part by reference to the AMA's policies. See, e.g., OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 4731.22(B)(18) (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2009) (requiring that the state medical board
"keep on file current copies of the codes of ethics of the various national professional organizations" and
providing that the board "shall" discipline or limit the right to practice of a medical provider for
"violation of any provision of a code of ethics of the American [Miedical [Alssociation ... or any other
national professional organizations that the board specifies by rule").
77. Some states have made such easy access to physician profiles mandatory by law. One review
indicates that:
Massachusetts and Florida currently have legislation requiring profiles of all licensed
physicians be available on the Web. Similar legislation has been introduced in California,
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These guiding principles for professional discipline in American law should
be relatively uncontroversial. While critics of the American system of medical
discipline may question whether current practice accurately reflects these principles
as a descriptive matter,7" I argue that, as a normative matter, these principles are not
only sound, but desirable.
C. Quantitative and Qualitative Concerns
Despite the fact that the theoretical underpinnings of the American medical
disciplinary regime are sound, the system as it is being practically implemented
boasts few supporters.79 Most critics challenge boards for initiating disciplinary
action too infrequently to substantially impact patient safety and public health.
80
Here, I argue that a more concerning problem may be the qualitative issue of how
boards set disciplinary priorities when faced with various categories of physician
misconduct.
The most common criticism that has been traditionally levied against medical
boards is that they simply do not discipline physicians often enough to have a
substantial impact on patient safety and public health.81 As a historical matter, low
rates of professional discipline have been the primary drivers of public discontent
with medical boards.82 While these challenges have resulted in some cyclical
variation in the frequency of professional discipline83 as well as recent legislative
Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Rhode Island, Texas and Vermont. The medical
licensing boards of Arizona, California, Iowa, Massachusetts, North Carolina and Texas all
now profile physicians holding licenses at <www.docboard.org> as well.
Frances H. Miller, Health Care Information Technology and Informed Consent: Computers and the
Doctor-Patient Relationship, 31 IND. L. REV. 1019, 1035 n.99 (1998) (citation omitted).
78. See generally Jost et al., supra note 2, 309-38 (discussing the weaknesses of the current
medical disciplinary board system).
79. See, e.g., id. at 332 (noting that although there is a general belief that medical licensure boards
should play a major role in assuring clinical competence, the truth is that most disciplinary actions have
no direct correlation with issues of clinical competence).
80. See id. at 330 (reporting that just 2.5% of public complaints resulted in formal disciplinary
action); Steven R. Smith, Medical and Psychotherapy Privileges and Confidentiality: On Giving with
One Hand and Removing with the Other, 75 KY. L.J. 473, 484 (1987) (remarking that the infrequency in
which boards resort to discipline in the medical and mental professions does little to protect patients and
their confidentiality).
81. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 5, at AI ("The [D.C.] board received roughly 318 complaints
against physicians between 1999 and 2004 for allegations ranging from negligent medical care to sexual
assault, but only four of the physicians were disciplined.").
82. See AMERINGER, supra note 35, at 5; Timothy S. Jost, Oversight of the Competence of
Healthcare Professionals, in REGULATION OF THE HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONS, supra note 35, at 17, 20-
21 (explaining that despite a shift from discipline to quality improvement within the health care
community, poor-performing practitioners remain).
83. See AMERINGER, supra note 35, at 5; Jost, supra note 82, at 20-21 (acknowledging shifting
priorities in the health care community).
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efforts to broaden medical board authority, 84 estimates suggest that less than one-
half of one percent of licensed physicians face serious discipline annually.
85
Moreover, consumer advocates continue to cite high rates of medical malpractice as
evidence that professional discipline is ineffective in protecting the public or
improving the quality of medical care. 6
While there may be some truth to the claims that boards do not pursue
professional discipline often enough, an unmediated focus on the rate of medical
discipline alone is unlikely to tell us much about boards' overall effectiveness in
protecting public interests. 87 The rate at which medical professionals face serious
discipline annually is comparable to the rate of serious professional discipline in
other professions, including law.88 It is also comparable to the rate of felony
convictions among the American public.89 While professional boards and
prosecutors certainly could be doing more to pursue those who violate professional
standards or break the law, given the parallels between the rates of professional
84. See Kevin B. O'Reilly, Doctor Disciplinary Actions Down for Third Year, AM. MED. NEWS
(May 12, 2008) (reporting that Indiana, New Mexico, and Washington enacted legislation in 2008 to
"beef!] up board authority," and that nine other states are considering similar changes); Nadia N.
Sawicki, Doctors, Discipline, and the Death Penalty: Professional Implications of Safe Harbor Policies,
27 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 107, 167 & n.284 (2008).
85. See Wolfe & Resnevic, supra note 6 (stating that between 2000 and 2007, roughly 3.5
physicians out of every thousand faced serious disciplinary action by state medical boards).
86. Frank P. Grad, Medical Malpractice and the Crisis of Insurance Availability: The Waning
Options, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1058, 1061-62 (1986) (arguing that the high number of medical
malpractice claims filed each year "belies the argument that private medical malpractice claims are an
important device to maintain professional discipline and competence."). This sentiment is shared by
even some medical board members. See BOVBJERG ET AL., supra note 46, at 33 (noting the "frustration"
expressed by board members that the current disciplinary process "was not finding enough of what
might be termed 'problem physicians' or not finding them soon enough").
87. See, e.g., Darren Grant & Kelly C. Alfred, Sanctions and Recidivism: An Evaluation of
Physician Discipline by State Medical Boards, 32 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 867, 872 (2007) ("[I]t
would be preferable not to assess board effectiveness by the rate of discipline alone."); Jost et al., supra
note 2, at 309-10, 336 ("[Ciounts of disciplinary actions . . . do not give us a full picture of board
activity .... [E]valuating board success solely on the basis of formal disciplinary actions is inadequate
because boards may be more active at the informal level than is commonly supposed.").
88. See Susan Daicoff, Asking Leopards to Change Their Spots: Should Lawyers Change? A
Critique of Solutions to Problems with Professionalism by Reference to Empirically-Derived Attorney
Personality Attributes, II GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 547, 549 n. 13 (noting that the rate of discipline for
attorneys is less than three-tenths of one percent); Jost, supra note 82, at 25 ("There is little reason to
believe that boards licensing other professions are doing better than medical boards in addressing
problems of competence through the disciplinary process.").
89. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, roughly 1,079,000 adults were convicted of
felonies in 2004. MATTHEW R. DUROSE & PATRICK A. LANGAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FELONY
SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2004, at 1 (2007), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/
fssc04.pdf. According to the Central Intelligence Agency in July 2009, the estimated population of the
United States was 307,212,123. Cent. Intelligence Agency, World Fact Book,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2010).
The estimated number of convicted felons is, thus, approximately 0.3% of the total United States
population.
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discipline and criminal conviction, the degree of invective levied at medical boards
by public advocates seems disproportionate. If low rates of board discipline suggest
a failure of the medical disciplinary system in protecting the public, then surely the
same criticism could be made about the effectiveness of state attorneys general in
prosecuting criminals. Moreover, consider these data in terms of numbers rather
than percentages: if each of the 3,000 physicians seriously disciplined each year
sees an average of 3,000 patients annually,90 then medical board discipline has a
direct impact on at least nine million patient interactions annually that might
otherwise be at risk. In sum, while the frequency of serious medical disciplinary
action is surely relevant to the question of whether medical boards have succeeded
in their mission of protecting the public, it is hardly the only relevant factor.91
Arguably more important in determining whether medical boards are likely to
be successful in protecting the public is the qualitative issue of which physicians
are being disciplined and on what substantive grounds. That is, if medical boards
can pursue only 3,000 serious disciplinary actions against physicians each year,
boards ought to ensure that the actions they do choose to take are on grounds likely
to have a substantial impact on patient safety and public health. Indeed, boards
inevitably make these kinds of judgment calls whenever they exercise their
disciplinary discretion.
When making these decisions, I argue that boards ought to be guided by the
three insights identified in Part I.B-that is, when comparing possible grounds for
discipline, they ought to ask which is likely to have the greatest impact on patient
92 9protection, which has the closest link to fitness to practice,93 and where each falls
on the spectrum from minimal competencies to aspirational standards.94 As noted
earlier, the constitutional floor for disciplinary action is low-because professional
discipline is subject to deferential review, boards only need to demonstrate that
their disciplinary actions satisfy a rational basis test.95 However, while the
substantive due process standard does little to constrain medical boards as a matter
90. See David C. Goodman, Twenty-Year Trends in Regional Variations in the U.S. Physician
Workforce, HEALTH AFF., Oct. 7, 2004, at VAR-90, VAR-95
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.var.90vI ("The most stringent federal definition of
primary care underservice is more than 3,000 people per generalist physician within a 'rational service
area."').
91. Grant & Alfred, supra note 87, at 872. These competing complaints call to mind the old joke
memorialized by Woody Allen in his film, Annie Hall. As his character, Alvy Singer, tells it, "Two
elderly women are at a Catskills mountain resort, and one of 'em says: 'Boy, the food at this place is
really terrible.' The other one says, 'Yeah, I know, and such.., small portions."' ANNIE HALL (United
Artists 1977).
92. See supra p. 295.
93. See supra pp. 295-96.
94. See supra p. 296-97.
95. See supra notes 62, 72 and accompanying text.
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of law, the fundamental principles underlying this standard can and should serve a
valuable function in helping boards prioritize their actions as a matter of practice.
Imagine that instead of a rational basis standard, medical boards were
required to demonstrate a "substantial relationship" between the grounds for
professional discipline and the state's admittedly important interest in ensuring an
individual's fitness to practice medicine. Under such an intermediate standard,
some categories of professional discipline would likely be constitutionally
impermissible-for example, disciplining physicians for failure to comply with the
hypothetical requirement (described above) that they counsel their patients about
voting in elections. 96 As the standard of constitutional scrutiny gets higher, medical
boards would have fewer and fewer permissible categories of discipline from which
to choose. While the standard of review for medical board discipline is currently set
very low, boards can and should use the sliding scale of scrutiny to guide them in
prioritizing their disciplinary decisions. In other words, boards should expend
greater resources on discipline that is narrowly tailored and least restrictive to
achieve the goal of ensuring fitness to practice-sanctioning physicians who cheat
on their medical licensing examinations, for example. In contrast, grounds for
discipline that bear only a rational or tangential relationship with fitness to practice
would not be deemed to be pressing concems.97
While efforts to more clearly delineate the scope of justifiable professional
discipline may be misconstrued as inappropriately limiting medical boards' ability
to protect the public, 98 these concerns are unfounded. The relevant issue is not
whether boards are disciplining physicians often enough, but rather whether boards
are exercising their disciplinary powers in the most effective and efficient manner.
Despite some recent expansions of authority, medical boards generally operate
under significant financial constraints, and necessarily maintain a system of triage
in matters of discipline. 99 Given that the frequency of board discipline is
significantly resource-driven,1 ° ° modifying boards' disciplinary priorities is likely
to be more effective than pushing for increased rates of discipline when resources
are scarce. The active pursuit of baseless or irrelevant complaints detracts from the
boards' ability to focus on professional misconduct that may have a far more direct
impact on patient safety and the protection of public health. 1°' Understanding how
96. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
97. See infra Part lI.B.
98. See, e.g., In re Kindschi, 319 P.2d 824, 827 (Wash. 1958) (stating that medical board
disciplinary proceedings are designed to protect the public and that medical boards have discretion in
deciding what types of unprofessional conduct should face discipline).
99. See BOVBJERG ET AL., supra note 46, at 9-10, 23 (describing the many challenges facing
disciplinary boards, including lack of funding); infra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
100. BOVBJERG ET AL., supra note 46, at 16-17 (noting that most of states studied operate "more
frugally than average" and that "constrained funding" limits boards' disciplinary capacity).
101. Imagine the potential impact if all the resources spent by medical boards in disciplining
character-related misconduct occurring outside the clinical sphere were instead redirected to address
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boards' disciplinary authority can justifiably be exercised and shifting resources
towards discipline that is narrowly tailored to achieve medical boards' goals is
likely to lead to substantial gains in both efficacy and efficiency.
II. APPLYING THE PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE
Having established that the frequency of medical discipline warrants less
study than the qualitative question of how medical boards set their disciplinary
priorities, this Part makes the case that the underlying principles of professional
discipline described in Part I do not support the imposition of severe disciplinary
sanctions against physicians whose misconduct falls outside the clinical sphere or
otherwise does not implicate patient safety or public health-including many
physicians with criminal convictions and those charged with unspecified
"unprofessional conduct," who are often disciplined under the current regime., ° 2
This Part concludes that unless medical boards are able to offer some other strong
justification for restricting medical licenses on these grounds, they should not
expend significant resources in these areas and ought to instead focus on issues
more closely linked to clinical competency and fitness to practice.'
0 3
A. Common Grounds for Disciplinary Action-Character, Not Competence
While precise figures are hard to come by, reviews of serious disciplinary
actions taken against licensed medical professionals in the past thirty years reveal
that medical boards rarely take disciplinary action on the basis of incompetent
medical practice or poor quality of care. Studies by the Office of the Inspector
General in the 1980s and 1990s, for example, consistently concluded that issues of
medical quality rank very low among medical boards' disciplinary priorities. 10 4
behavior with a more direct impact on patient health and welfare-for example, substandard care or
intentional violation of patient informed consent. See NAT'L QUALITY FORUM, SERIOUS REPORTABLE
EVENTS IN HEALTHCARE 1 (2002), available at http://www.qualityforum.org/WorkArea/
linkit.aspx?Linkldentifier=id&ltemlD=1221 (describing the occurrence of "never events," which are
serious preventable adverse health events and relate directly to patient care); Paul Jung et al., U.S.
Physicians Disciplined for Criminal Activity, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 335, 350 tbl.4 (2006) (noting that
almost seventy-five percent of offenses by physicians in the study impacted patients or the health system
generally).
102. See infra Part II.A-B.
103. See infra Part II.C.
104. See 1990 OIG REPORT, supra note 47, at 15 (noting the infrequency of quality of care cases
among those that resulted in disciplinary action, and reporting that in 1988, "incompetence" cases
accounted for only 11.5% of all disciplinary actions taken by state boards, while 57% of actions
involved misprescribing, impairment, or narcotics violations); OFFICE OF ANALYSIS & INSPECTIONS,
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MEDICAL LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE: AN OVERVIEW 13-14
(1986), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oai-01-86-00064.pdf [hereinafter 1986 OIG REPORT]
(revealing that inappropriate writing of prescriptions and self-abuse of drugs or alcohol are the two
dominant types of violations that are grounds for disciplinary action by state boards, while
incompetency cases are rare).
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"[W]e've never had a disciplinary action based on malpractice," reported one
medical board director, and "when there is a malpractice case, we tend to look for
another basis for disciplinary action."' 0 5 Indeed, my own review of data provided
by the Federation of State Medical Boards (FSMB) 10 6 suggests as much-fewer
than 15% of professional disciplinary actions taken between 1999 and 2008 appear
to have been taken on grounds clearly related to clinical competence. 10 7 Other
studies show slightly higher figures-Grant and Alfred's analysis of data compiled
by the Public Citizen Health Research Group found that 18.8% of sanctions were
based on "substandard care, incompetence, or negligence,"'0 8 while their analysis
of FSMB data suggested that up to a third of serious disciplinary actions may be
taken on grounds related to competency in medical practice.'1 9 Regardless of the
exact figures, it is surprising that in an era of "never events" and rising malpractice
premiums," 0 the state boards charged with granting medical licenses and ensuring
continued fitness to practice medicine do not seem to be prioritizing competency-
related issues.
If medical boards are not regularly pursuing discipline against physicians who
engage in malpractice or clearly violate standards of clinical quality, then what
categories of misconduct do they pursue? Although the majority of disciplinary
actions are taken on unspecified grounds,"' the ones that are categorized tend to
105. 1986 OIG REPORT, supra note 104, at 14.
106. Many thanks to Dr. Aaron Young, Senior Director for Research and Analytics at the Federation
of State Medical Boards (FSMB), for providing the data used for this analysis. Note that the data
provided by FSMB is a compilation of state-level data reported by the state boards of medicine, which
are not necessarily consistent in how they categorize the grounds for professional discipline.
Accordingly, these figures may be imprecise; I have used them only to get a very broad sense of the
frequency of various disciplinary grounds.
107. Clinically-related grounds for discipline include, inter alia, practicing with lapsed license,
malpractice, inappropriate treatment/diagnosis, failure to conform to minimal standards of acceptable
medical practice, failure to adequately supervise, and performing improper or unnecessary surgery.
According to my review of FSMB data, supra note 106, these actions accounted for 14.2% of all
disciplinary actions reported to FSMB between 1999 and 2008.
108. Grant & Alfred, supra note 87, at 875 tbl.2.
109. See id. (finding based on FSMB data that "negligence" accounted for 14.5% of sanctions,
"failure to conform to minimal standards of acceptable medical practice" accounted for 12.2%, and
"gross negligence" accounted for 7%).
110. JAY ANGOFF, FALLING CLAIMS AND RISING PREMIUMS IN THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
INSURANCE INDUSTRY I, 6 chart 1 (2005), available at http://www.centeijd.org/archives/studies/
ANGOFFReport.pdf (noting the recent doubling of medical malpractice premiums); NAT'L QUALITY
FORUM, supra note 101, at I (discussing "never events").
11. See Grant & Alfred, supra note 87, at 875 tbl.2. Unfortunately, the most commonly reported
disciplinary code-not applicable, appearing in over sixty-five percent of cases-provides no useful
information about the grounds for professional discipline. Id. According to Grant and Alfred, not
applicable is used when the board and physician enter the equivalent of a settlement agreement, "in
which the physician agrees to the [sanction] ... but without being found guilty of violating the statute
for which he or she is under investigation. Since the disciplined physician is never legally found guilty
of the offense, the nature of the investigation is not reported." Id. at 874. My own review of FSMB data,
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fall within three broad categories--drug or alcohol abuse, criminal convictions, and
unspecified unprofessional conduct.' "
2
According to the Office of the Inspector General, until the 1990s, medical
boards frequently concentrated on physicians with drug and alcohol abuse
problems, as well as those with criminal convictions." 3 However, more recent
studies of disciplinary data nationwide suggest that medical boards' disciplinary
priorities have changed somewhat in the past two decades.' 14 Currently, discipline
on the basis of drug- and alcohol-related misconduct accounts for between fifteen
and twenty percent of actions." 15 The studies that distinguish between drug-related
misconduct that is directly linked to medical practice (e.g., signing blank
prescription forms, practicing medicine while under the influence, and
overprescribing drugs) and general substance abuse problems that may not manifest
themselves in the professional sphere (e.g., conviction for driving under the
influence or chemical dependency) suggest that less than ten percent of these cases
are directly tied to medical practice." 
6
Another significant category of professional discipline is discipline on the
basis of criminal misconduct or conviction, which accounts for approximately ten
percent of actions (with some estimates as high as seventeen percent)." 7 Moreover,
recent studies confirm that many of the most serious disciplinary actions taken on
the basis of criminal convictions involve criminal misconduct with no immediately
apparent impact on patient safety or public health. 18 One recent study used data
supra note 106, indicated that 24.7% of cases were recorded as not applicable, and 1.2% were recorded
as not reported.
112. Grant & Alfred, supra note 87, at 874-75 & tbl.2. Other less-frequently occurring grounds for
discipline include fraud, physical or mental impairment, sexual misconduct, failure to maintain medical
records, and administrative reasons (prior violations, failure to comply with terms of probation). Id.
113. 1990 OIG REPORT, supra note 47, at 15 (reviewing data as of 1988 and concluding that
between 57% and 66% of disciplinary actions taken were on alcohol- or drug-related grounds); 1986
OIG REPORT, supra note 104, at 13-14 (identifying inappropriate writing of prescriptions, self-abuse of
drugs or alcohol, and conviction of a felony or fraud as the most common grounds for discipline).
114. Grant & Alfred, supra note 87, at 875 & tbl.2.
115. See id. at 875 tbl.2. Grant and Alfred's review of FSMB data between 1994 and 2002
concluded that substance abuse accounted for 9.5% of sanctions and chemical dependency accounted for
6.5% of actions. Id. In the same article, the review of data collected by Public Citizen Health Research
Group between 1990 and 1999 found that substance abuse accounted for 10% of sanctions and
misprescribing or overprescribing drugs accounted for 7.7% of sanctions. Id. My own review of data
provided by FSMB between 1999 and 2008, supra note 106, indicates that approximately 3.8% of
actions are taken on the basis of drug-related misconduct directly tied to clinical practice and 7.6% of
actions are taken on the basis of drug or alcohol violations generally.
116. E.g., Grant & Alfred, supra note 87, at 876.
117. Id. at 875 tbl.2 (finding that "criminal conviction" accounts for 17.2% of discipline based on
Public Citizen Health Research Group data); Jung et al., supra note 101, at 340 (stating that between
1990 and 1999, actions related to criminal convictions ranged from 8.0% to 11.5%). My own review of
FSMB data, supra note 106, suggests that approximately 4.7% of actions are taken on the basis of
criminal conviction.
118. E.g., Jung et al., supra note 101, at 350 tbl.4.
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compiled by Public Citizen's Health Research Group to look at all disciplinary
actions taken in the 1990s on the basis of a physician's criminal conduct, and
classified these disciplinary actions based on whether the misconduct at issue
involved patients, the health care system broadly defined, or neither." 9 The authors
demonstrated that almost a quarter of these actions involved conduct that impacted
neither patient care nor the medical system broadly defined. 120 Moreover, those
categories of misconduct not directly linked to medicine or patient care (i.e., sex
offenses, murder and manslaughter, public drunkenness, general criminal conduct)
tend to be disciplined more severely than categories of misconduct that bear a
closer connection to competent medical practice (i.e., prescribing violations,
"criminal misconduct related to medicine," insurance fraud). 12
However, according to a review of data compiled by FSMB between 1994
and 2002, unspecified "unprofessional conduct" was the single most frequently
cited ground for discipline, appearing in approximately a third of all cases.
22
Without further information, of course, it is impossible to know whether and to
what extent the targeted conduct implicates patient safety or public health, 23 but a
review of the kinds of disciplinary actions that rise to the level of judicial review
offers some troubling implications. Medical boards have suspended medical
licenses on the grounds of "unprofessional conduct" for a variety of criminal and
character-related misconduct, including personal income tax fraud,' 24 shoplifting,' 25
119. Id. at 337-38.
120. Id. at 350 tbl.4.
121. Id. at 342, 348 tbl.2. On a category-by-category basis, this certainly seems to be the case;
indeed, the authors note that "offenses in categories that involve the health-care system resulted in a
wide range of orders of differing severity." Id. at 344. That said, the authors note that on an offense-by-
offense basis, offenses involving patients generally tend to result in "more severe orders." Id.
122. Grant & Alfred, supra note 87, at 875 tbl.2 (reporting that 33.4% of actions were taken on the
basis of "unprofessional conduct," not including sexual misconduct, which accounted for an additional
7.1% of sanctions). Public Citizen Health Research Group's data had slightly lower figures. Id. (finding
12.9% of actions for "professional misconduct" and 12.2% of actions for "noncompliance with a
professional rule"). My own review of FSMB data from 1999 to 2008, supra note 106, suggests that
approximately 14. 1% were unspecified unprofessional or unethical conduct.
123. See Grant & Alfred, supra note 87, at 876 (noting that the databases used are not "sufficiently
precise that one can pinpoint the number of actions directly or indirectly related to quality of care"). One
solution to this problem, and one I wholeheartedly endorse, is for state medical boards to use
standardized and more specific categories for reporting disciplinary actions to FSMB. Id. at 868, 870,
874-75 (describing one criticism of medical boards as "nonuniformity of sanctions across states" and
noting the geographical variations in certain categories of sanctions). In order for scholars to evaluate
whether boards are achieving their stated goals, it is important to collect more specific data, which are
currently unavailable at a national level. See id. at 868, 870 (acknowledging structural differences
between states).
124. E.g., Windham v. Bd. of Med. Quality Assurance, 163 Cal. Rptr. 566, 570 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)
("[W]e find it difficult to compartmentalize dishonesty in such a way that a person who is willing to
cheat his government out of ... taxes may yet be considered honest in his dealings with his patients.");
In re Kindschi, 319 P.2d 824, 825, 827 (Wash. 1958) (holding that a guilty plea to a charge of tax
evasion constitutes an adequate showing of moral turpitude before a medical disciplinary board).
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failure to facilitate review of child support obligations, 126 soliciting sex in a public
restroom, 127 possession of marijuana for personal use,' 28 reckless driving involving
alcohol, 129 and witness intimidation.
130
Often, when boards take serious disciplinary action on the basis of
unprofessional behavior or criminal conduct, the sanctioned physicians challenge
their suspensions on due process grounds, arguing that their behavior, while
possibly indicative of poor personal judgment or character, is simply not relevant to
their fitness to practice medicine.' 3 ' Consider, for example, the case of Dr. Ansar, a
physician who practiced at a veterans' hospital, providing medical care to an
underserved population. 32 In the midst of a bitter divorce and custody dispute, Dr.
Ansar called the police to report that his wife had attacked him with a knife when
in fact, his injury was self-inflicted, a feeble attempt to gain advantage in the legal
proceedings. 33 When the police arrived and Dr. Ansar realized that they were
going to take his wife into custody, he immediately recanted his statement, but was
nevertheless charged and convicted of filing a false police report.' 34 Subsequently,
the state medical board suspended his license to practice medicine for six months
on the grounds that Dr. Ansar had committed a "misdemeanor involving moral
turpitude."' 135 The board's decision was upheld on appeal.
136
125. E.g., Mao v. Super. Ct., No. C058547, 2008 WL 4997602, at *7-*8 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 25,
2008) (concluding that shoplifting multiple times per month "will certainly interfere with [one's] ability
to care for. . . 'extremely ill' patients" and "demonstrate[s] an unfitness to practice medicine").
126. E.g., Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1032-33 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that California's
requirement that professional licensees disclose their social security numbers so that the state can
determine if they failed to pay child support does not violate due process because being current in child
support and tax obligations is an element of moral character and therefore related to fitness to practice).
127. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, Ill Cal. Rptr. 353, 354 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973)
(involving the offense of "soliciting a male adult to engage in a lewd and dissolute act").
128. E.g., Weissbuch v. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 116 Cal. Rptr. 479, 480-81, 483 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974)
(stating that the medical board found the physician guilty of unprofessional conduct after being
convicted of possession of marijuana, but holding that the board should dismiss the proceeding).
129. E.g., Griffiths v. Super. Ct., 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 445, 448 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
130. E.g., McDonnell v. Comm'n on Med. Discipline, 483 A.2d 76, 81 (Md. 1984) (reversing a
medical board's decision to discipline a physician who was being sued by a former patient for medical
malpractice where the physician allegedly engaged in the intimidation of expert witnesses); In re
Lustgarten, 629 S.E.2d 886, 892 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (reversing the North Carolina Medical Board's
decision to discipline a physician testifying as an expert witness for allegedly testifying in bad faith that
another physician was testifying falsely).
131. E.g., McLaughlin, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
132. Ansar v. State Med. Bd., No. 08AP-17, 2008 WL 2514818, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. June 24,
2008).
133. Id.
134. Id. at *1, *3.
135. Id. at *1; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(B)(13) (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2009)
(providing that the state medical board "shall, to the extent permitted by law, limit, revoke, or suspend
an individual's certificate to practice, refuse to register an individual, refuse to reinstate a certificate, or
reprimand or place on probation" a physician who pleads guilty to or is convicted of "a misdemeanor
involving moral turpitude").
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B. An Imperfect Fit with the Principles of Professional Discipline
The fact that physicians are frequently sanctioned for engaging in character-
related or criminal misconduct is troubling in light of the three fundamental
principles of professional discipline identified in Part I. The constitutional
limitations on medical board action suggest that boards ought to be primarily
concerned with enforcing minimal standards of fitness to practice in an effort to
protect consumers of medical services. 37 It hardly seems obvious why, given the
harms suffered by patients on a daily basis as a result of "never events"'1 38 and other
medical errors and instances of medical negligence, boards should be using their
scarce resources to discipline physicians for character-related misconduct occurring
outside the clinical sphere, particularly where such behavior is already subject to
criminal or civil sanctions.
139
To take just one concrete example, consider the case of Dr. Ansar, described
above. If the State Medical Board of Ohio had considered the fundamental
principles of professional discipline in determining whether or not to revoke Dr.
Ansar's medical license, it is by no means clear that the case would have come out
as it had.
Consider first whether the state's goal of public protection was well-served by
allowing the medical board to exercise its disciplinary discretion in this manner-in
other words, was restricting Dr. Ansar's right to practice medicine for six months
likely to protect his patients or others from harm? It is difficult to identify any
specific patient harm that would occur if Dr. Ansar were permitted to continue
practicing, let alone harm that could be traced to the incident in which he filed a
false police report against his wife. Of course, Dr. Ansar's behavior did cause
physical harm to himself (the self-inflicted stab wound) and had the potential to
harm his wife, an innocent victim of wrongful prosecution. His conduct also caused
harm to the public more broadly, given that the state expended resources dealing
with a false alarm rather than responding to true emergencies. However, given that
these concerns are adequately addressed by the criminal laws under which Dr.
Ansar was prosecuted, 140 it is hard to say that professional discipline would have a
significant impact on public protection in this regard. In contrast, it is likely that
restricting his right to practice resulted in some harm to an underprivileged
136. Ansar, 2008 WL 2514818, at *7.
137. See supra Part II.B.
138. The National Quality Forum has identified 27 "never events" that should never happen in any
clinical setting-including surgery performed on the wrong patient or the wrong part of the body,
unintended retention of a foreign object in a patient's body during surgery, and similar events. NAT'L
QUALITY FORUM, supra note 101, at 6-7 tbl.1.
139. See Jung et al., supra note 101, at 350 tbl.4 (finding that 23.5% of disciplinary actions that are
conviction-related did not involve patients or the health system generally).
140. Ansar, 2008 WL 2514818, at *3-*4.
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population already at a high risk of receiving inadequate care, 14 1 given that Dr.
Ansar practiced in a veterans' hospital.1
42
To justify prioritizing this kind of disciplinary action, the Ohio Medical Board
should have been able to demonstrate that its decision to revoke Dr. Ansar's license
was based on minimal, rather than aspirational, standards of physician competency.
Moreover, it should have demonstrated some clear connection between Dr. Ansar's
criminal conduct and his fitness to practice medicine-that is, while only a rational
connection may be required as a constitutional matter, the board should have
applied higher standards internally as it determined whether to proceed against Dr.
Ansar or direct its resources toward other cases.
Three kinds of arguments have typically been offered to support the claim
that character-related misconduct is closely linked to fitness to practice-but
whether grounded in prediction, trust, or social contract theory, none are
compelling enough to suggest that boards should actively pursue discipline on these
grounds.
One of the arguments that medical boards and courts have often used to
justify discipline for character-related misconduct outside the professional sphere is
that it may be predictive of misconduct or error in clinical practice. One can
imagine, for example, the board in Dr. Ansar's case arguing for such a predictive
link-if Dr. Ansar feels no qualms about filing a false police report and wrongfully
accusing his wife of assault, then perhaps he would be similarly inclined towards
dishonesty in Medicare billing, or in falsely documenting his conversations with
patients when informed consent is at issue. Courts have long used these kinds of
predictive arguments in upholding the disciplinary determinations made by medical
boards. 43 The Washington Supreme Court, for example, held in Haley v. Medical
Disciplinary Board144 that a physician's conviction for tax fraud indicates a lack of
141. See generally NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIS., S. REP. No. 95-4, STUDY OF
HEALTH CARE FOR AMERICAN VETERANS 1-3 (1977) (arguing that health care programs are
inadequately equipped to handle the number of patients who need care); Robert Pear, Report Outlines
Medical Errors in VA. Hospitals, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1999, at 1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/r1999/12/19/us/report-outlines-medical-errors-in-va-hospitals.htmi (describing
a report that found almost 3,000 medical mistakes, of which 700 patients died, in less than two years in
veterans hospitals in the United States).
142. Ansar, 2008 WL 2514818, at *1.
143. See, e.g., Griffiths v. Super. Ct., 117 Cal. Rprt. 2d 445, 455 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (denying a
petition for a writ of administrative mandate, which challenged a sanction imposed by the state medical
board for three convictions involving alcohol consumption, based on the state's interest in preventing
future harm to the public through such conduct); Krain v. Med. Bd., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 586, 592 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1999) ("[T]he intentional solicitation to commit a crime [that] has as its hallmark an act of
dishonesty cannot be divorced from the obligation of utmost honesty and integrity to the patients whom
the physician counsels .... ); Haley v. Med. Disciplinary Bd., 818 P.2d 1062, 1069 (Wash. 1991)
("Being convicted of tax fraud does not indicate any lack of competence in the technical skills needed to
be a physician. Rather, it indicates a lack of the high degree of trustworthiness the public is entitled to
expect from a physician.").
144. 818 P.2d 1062.
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trustworthiness, raising a "reasonable apprehension" that he might likewise "abuse
the trust inherent in professional status."'' 45 Writing of the disciplined physician, the
court explained its difficulty in "compartmentaliz[ing] dishonesty in such a way
that a person who is willing to cheat his government out of $65,000 in taxes may
yet be considered honest in his dealings with his patients."'146 In other words, if
maintaining honesty in patient relations is an element of safe and effective medical
practice, disciplinary action may be appropriate against a physician who engages in
dishonest behavior in the personal realm on the grounds that he is likewise
predisposed to dishonesty in the context of medical practice.
While prediction theory may seem promising at first glance, it does not
actually resolve the question of whether the substantive grounds for professional
discipline bear a rational relationship to fitness to practice. Taken at face value,
prediction theory might justify disciplining a physician with any characteristic that
correlates with medical misconduct or poor clinical judgment in the patient care
setting, regardless of its relevance to fitness to practice. Imagine, for example, that
a retrospective study reveals that male OB/GYNs practicing in rural areas, or
physicians who engage in extramarital affairs, are found fifty times more likely to
commit medical errors or lose patient malpractice suits. 147 Surely this predictive
145. Id. at 1069.
146. Id. at 1070; see also Krain, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 592 (finding that soliciting the subordination of
perjury, an act of dishonesty, is inherently tied to the physician's obligations of honesty and integrity).
147. Little empirical research has been done on the predictors of professional misconduct and
discipline in the legal or medical realms. See Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional
Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 491, 556 (1985) (summarizing research on predictors of attorney discipline). In
the context of medical practice, most studies examining the predictors of clinical misconduct or
disciplinary complaints look only at correlations with length of practice, gender, race, and other similar
demographic characteristics. See, e.g., Roberto Cardarelli et al., Predicting Risk for Disciplinary Action
by a State Medical Board, 100 TEXAS MED. 84, 84 (2004) ("The primary variables in the database [of
disciplined physicians in Texas] included years in practice, sex, race or ethnicity, medical degree and
training, primary specialty, and method of licensure."); James Morrison & Peter Wickersham,
Physicians Disciplined by a State Medical Board, 279 JAMA 1889, 1890-91 (1998) (examining
discipline based on location, gender, and type of practice). Others look at medical school grades and
examination scores, but not aspects of character or personality. See, e.g., Hossam Hamdy et al., BEME
Systematic Review: Predictive Values of Measurements Obtained in Medical Schools and Future
Performance in Medical Practice, 28 MED. TEACHER 103, 105 (2006) (reviewing studies that evaluated,
among other things, medical school scores and ratings when predicting outcomes in clinical practice);
Robyn Tamblyn et al., Physician Scores on a National Clinical Skills Examination as Predictors of
Complaints to Medical Regulatory Authorities, 298 JAMA 993, 999 (2007) (using patient-physician
communication examination scores to predict future complaints in practice). The only marginally useful
studies of predictors of medical misconduct reveal high rates of disciplinary recidivism, Grant & Alfred,
supra note 87, at 868, or a connection between "unprofessional conduct" in medical school and board
discipline. Maxine A. Papadakis et al., Disciplinary Action by Medical Boards and Prior Behavior in
Medical School, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2673, 2679 (2005). Of course, lack of empirical support in an
area where little empirical research has been done is not a reason to reject the predictive argument
altogether. If a strong theoretical argument can be made in support of a connection between discrete
elements of personal character and clinical harm to patients, then perhaps this hypothesis can be used to
direct future empirical research about the predictive value of character-related misconduct. Moreover,
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link alone would not justify preemptive discipline, absent a separate finding that the
physician lacks the intrinsic characteristics of education, training, and character that
form the foundation of competent medical practice. If we are serious about a
substantive due process limitation that demands that licensure and discipline
requirements be rationally related to fitness to practice, the prediction theory is a
poor substitute.
Alternatively, a medical board could use trust theory to justify a disciplinary
inquiry into character-related misconduct. Trust theorists posit that misconduct
outside the clinical sphere is a legitimate subject for professional discipline if it is
likely to cause public distrust of the medical profession. 148 The Ansar opinion
touched on this issue briefly, where the appeals court upheld the trial court's
"conclusion that Dr. Ansar's conduct violated moral sentiment and the accepted
moral standards of the community, thereby potentially eroding the public's esteem
for him."'149 Taking this statement at face value, it is difficult to understand how
inquiries into personal misconduct that lowers public opinion of the profession (but
does not otherwise harm patients) relates to the state's interests in protecting public
health and welfare. Indeed, few courts have ever expressly identified why the
state's police powers justify disciplinary action that serves only to protect the
medical profession's position in society. 150 Perhaps the strongest defense was
provided by the Washington Supreme Court in Haley, where it affirmed that
"preserving [medical] professionalism is not an end in itself," but merely "an
instrumental end pursued in order to serve the state's legitimate interest in
promoting and protecting the public welfare."'15 The court wrote:
To perform their professional duties effectively, physicians must enjoy
the trust and confidence of their patients. Conduct that lowers the
even if empirical research did demonstrate a link between personal character and safe medical practice,
it is by no means clear that the existing system of medical licensure and discipline would be the most
accurate or effective mechanism for evaluating personal character. See generally Rhode, supra, at 556
(noting that further empirical research is needed on whether disciplinary authorities can assess
individual morality and fitness based on discrete prior acts).
148. See, e.g., In re Kindschi, 319 P.2d 824, 826 (Wash. 1958) ("[D]isciplinary action is to be taken
against [a physician] in order to maintain sound professional standards of conduct for the purpose of
protecting . . . the standing of the medical profession in the eyes of the public."); Mark A. Hall, Law,
Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 491 (2002) ("[T]he authority to discipline doctors for
unprofessional conduct relate[s] directly to trust.").
149. Ansar v. State Med. Bd., No. 08AP-17, 2008 WL 2514818, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. June 24,
2008).
150. The Washington Supreme Court in In re Kindschi, for example, identified the dual goals of
professional discipline as protecting the public and protecting "the standing of the medical profession in
the eyes of the public." 319 P.2d at 826. More recently, the court held that "conduct may indicate
unfitness to practice medicine if it ... lowers the standing of the medical profession in the public's
eyes." Haley, 818 P.2d at 1069; see also In re Lesansky, 17 P.3d 764, 767 (Cal. 2001) ("Attorney
discipline is imposed when necessary 'to protect the public, to promote confidence in the legal system,
and to maintain high professional standards ... .
151. Haley, 818 P.2d at 1070.
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public's esteem for physicians erodes that trust and confidence, and so
undermines a necessary condition for the profession's execution of its
vital role in preserving public health through medical treatment and
advice. 152
This link between public trust and professional efficacy has been widely recognized
by legal scholars, most notably by Mark Hall, who posits that trust is a fundamental
element of the healing relationship, 153 without which vulnerable patients would not
be willing to seek care" 4 and the medical profession would not be able to
effectively achieve the state's goals in patient welfare and public health., 55 Under
this view, then, any behavior that diminishes patients' confidence in the medical
profession could be an appropriate subject for professional discipline.
This approach towards character-related physician misconduct is problematic
for the same reasons as the predictive theory. Even accepting a connection between
private misconduct and public trust in medicine, 156 this kind of correlation alone
may not be a strong enough justification for state intervention when other kinds of
misconduct are likely to have a greater negative impact on patient care. Patients
may place faith in their physicians for any number of reasons-their religion, their
affiliation with a particular hospital, their personal appearance-and it is by no
means clear why a state should facilitate patient decisions that are based on non-
clinical, irrelevant, or potentially discriminatory factors that have no clear link with
fitness or competency to practice medicine. 5 7 In defining a physician's character
by reference to public perception, courts have effectively defined it outside of the
scope of fitness to practice, which under even a relatively uncontroversial definition
speaks to the physician's intrinsic capabilities in the realm of education, training,
152. Id.
153. Hall, supra note 148, at 480.
154. Id. at 478; Mark A. Hall et al., Trust in Physicians and Medical Institutions: What Is It, Can It
Be Measured, and Does It Matter?, 79 MILBANK Q. 613, 614 (2001).
155. See David Mechanic, The Functions and Limitations of Trust in the Provision of Medical Care,
23 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 661, 662 (1998) ("The erosion of trust ... damages the effectiveness of
medical interventions .... ); STARR, supra note 27, at 5 (addressing the importance of clinical authority
to the therapeutic process).
156. Empirical evidence of whether a single physician's misconduct actually affects public trust in
the profession as a whole, and whether disciplinary action taken by a state medical board actually serves
to counteract this effect, is by no means conclusive. See Hall, supra note 148, at 498 (noting that two
competing viewpoints exist regarding patient trust in the medical profession: one is that patients' trust is
contingent and can be affected by legal rules and attitudes, while the other viewpoint assumes that
medical trust is inherently strong and will persist regardless of what the law says or how physicians
behave).
157. See generally Robert Gatter, Faith, Confidence, and Health Care: Fostering Trust in Medicine
Through Law, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 395, 406-07 (2004) (distinguishing between trust as faith and
trust as confidence in competence); Mark A. Hall, Caring, Curing, and Trust: A Response to Gatter, 39
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 447, 447-48 (2004) (stating that faith and confidence are intertwined in medical
arenas and the necessity to enforce conditions of trustworthiness by requiring levels of competence and
loyalty that approximate what patients expect of their physicians).
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and character. In contrast, when courts write about protecting the profession's
standing, they are describing a change in public perception, rather than a change in
qualities intrinsic to the medical professional. 58 Defining the character element of
fitness to practice by reference to public perception has the potential to encompass
even some categories of conduct that bear only the weakest connection to the
state's interest in protecting the public's health and medical welfare. For example,
though a physician's possession of two unregistered submachine guns may tend to
"undermine[] public confidence in the integrity of the profession,"'159 it is difficult
to see how this fact alone would call into question the physician's ability to practice
medicine safely and with the best interests of patients at heart. Accordingly,
although the argument from public trust may offer one explanation of how
professional discipline serves the state's police power goals, it alone is not an
adequate justification for discipline that does not otherwise satisfy constitutional
scrutiny, or that has a less direct impact on patient safety or public health.
160
A final argument that can be made to justify professional discipline for
character-related misconduct is grounded in social contract theory. While it may
bear some similarities to the trust arguments described above, it is worth discussing
in its own right. In the context of medicine, social contract theory posits that
medical professionals are entitled to the privileges of exclusive licensure and self-
regulation only by virtue of an (implicit or explicit) agreement to take
responsibility for the provision of important social goods16' and to hold themselves
158. See, e.g., Raymond v. Bd. of Registration, 443 N.E.2d 391, 394 (Mass. 1982) (noting the
medical board's conclusion that a "lack of good moral character and conduct that undermines public
confidence in the integrity of the medical profession are grounds for discipline").
159. Id. at 395.
160. Another common criticism is that defining fitness to practice by reference to public trust is
evidence of the profession's "shallow vanity," rather than any concern for public welfare. Cf Keith
Swisher, The Troubling Rise of the Legal Profession's Good Moral Character, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
1037, 1062 (2008) (criticizing the legal profession's concern with its own self-image). Swisher argues
that:
The bar is not concerned with reputable character in any meaningful sense. As we have seen,
it routinely denies applicants of present reputable character. Such denials would be wholly
arbitrary under a reputable character standard. Instead, the bar is more concerned with
'reputable relational character'-that is, whether an applicant's past conduct is consistent
with the bar's perceived self-image. This outlandish definition reconciles the cases-'fitness'
to practice law is fitness to cohere with the bar's exalted self-image.
Id.
161. See generally MICHAEL D. BAYLES, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 12 (1989) (stating that professions
such as medicine have created monopolies with self-regulation that are created for the benefit of society
and are unjustified if they do not fulfill this societal benefit); WILBERT E. MOORE, THE PROFESSIONS:
ROLES AND RULES 6 (1970) ("[T]he professional proceeds by his own judgment and authority; he thus
enjoys autonomy restrained by responsibility."); WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY: THE
CRISIS AND PROMISE OF PROFESSIONALISM IN AMERICA 4-5 (2d ed. 2005) (arguing that professionalism
entails partnership between the public and professional group, where the profession is given the
privilege of setting standards and disciplining with the public welfare in mind); CORINNE LATHROP
GELB, HIDDEN HIERARCHIES: THE PROFESSIONS AND GOVERNMENT 53-54 (1966) (observing that
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to higher standards of conduct than the general population. 62 Accordingly, if a
physician breaches this social contract, the state would be justified in restricting his
right to practice.
The primary problem with this approach is that it is not clear either that such a
social contract exists, or that it binds physicians to particular standards of personal
character or behavior. After all, if reasonable decisionmakers can disagree as to
whether tax fraud constitutes "unprofessional conduct" subject to professional
discipline, 163 it is difficult to conclude that there is a social contract between
physicians and society prohibiting this behavior. Moreover, if we think of the many
kinds of obligations that could be imposed on physicians as a condition of licensure
but that American law fails to recognize in that context-for example, the
obligation to provide uncompensated care to indigent patients,' 6 4 or the obligation
to treat patients during a public health emergency even at their own risk165 -social
contract theory seems even less relevant in justifying obligations with a more
tenuous link to public health and patient safety. Indeed, social contract theory is
typically used to defend the ethical obligations, rather than the legal obligations, of
professionals desire peer-group control and, to justify this special position of authority, the professional
ethic emphasizes truth and justice to reassure the public).
162. See SULLIVAN, supra note 161, at 2 (finding that these professions hold these "positions of
honor on the basis of the social contract with the public they serve"); William M. Sullivan, What Is Left
of Professionalism After Managed Care?, 29 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr, 1999, at 7, 8 (stating
that since professionals "require significant individual discretion" they are "thought to require a stronger
sense of moral dedication than most occupations").
163. Compare Haley v. Med. Disciplinary Bd., 818 P.2d 1062, 1069 (Wash. 1991) (stating that
being convicted of tax fraud indicates a lack of trustworthiness causing reasonable apprehension a
physician might abuse the trust inherent in professional status), and In re Kindschi, 319 P.2d 824, 826
(Wash. 1958) (holding that conduct of a member of the profession can warrant disciplinary action to
maintain sound professional standards of conduct), with Rossiter v. Ohio State Med. Bd., No. OIAP-
1252, 2002 WL 723811, at *1, *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2002) (finding that a physician's failure to
file a tax return was not a crime of moral turpitude warranting suspension of his medical license).
164. Such obligations are found in the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
(EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006), and other laws, providing for fines in the case of
noncompliance, but are unrelated to licensing standards.
165. See generally Judith C. Ahronheim, Service by Health Care Providers in a Public Health
Emergency: The Physician's Duty and the Law, 12 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 195, 206-32 (2009)
(discussing the physician's duty of care during public health emergencies); Heidi Maim et al., Ethics,
Pandemics, and the Duty to Treat, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Aug. 2008, at 4, 16 (discussing the general duty of
health care professionals to treat patients); Nadia N. Sawicki, Without Consent: Moral Imperatives,
Special Abilities, and the Duty to Treat, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Aug, 2008, at 33, 35 (stating that the duty to
treat is a moral imperative). The highly controversial Model State Emergency Health Powers Act
attempts to tie physician licensure requirements to obligations during emergencies. MODEL STATE
EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT § 608 (Ctr. for L. & Pub.'s Health at Georgetown & Johns Hopkins
Univs., Proposed Draft 2001), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf;
see also Ahronheim, supra, at 229-30 (discussing the mandate to serve under the Model State
Emergency Health Powers Act).
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professionals.' 66 Moreover, even assuming that physicians enter into a clear social
contract prohibiting character-related misconduct when they receive their medical
licenses, social contract theory faces the same problems as prediction theory and
trust theories: while requiring that licensed professionals satisfy higher standards of
character may serve the state's goals in protecting public welfare, it may run afoul
of the fitness to practice limitation on professional licensure and discipline.
In sum, while most instances of discipline on character-related grounds, like
that against Dr. Ansar, may serve the state's police power goals, they fail to take
into account the fundamental legal principles underlying professional discipline,
particularly the constitutional limitation that professional board action bear a
rational relationship to fitness to practice.' 67 Moreover, when compared to other
kinds of misconduct by physicians-for example, carving one's initials into a
patient during surgery, 168 or sexually assaulting a patient169-- character-related
misconduct like Dr. Ansar's seems much less closely tied to the competent practice
of medicine, and so much less likely to have a significant impact on patient safety.
Indeed, the Court reviewing the board's decision acknowledged as much, noting
that "Dr. Ansar's conviction is not among the most serious misdemeanors
involving moral turpitude" cited in the case law. 170 If we believe in the concept of
disciplinary minimalism, it would seem that the public's goals are better served
when boards exercise their disciplinary discretion against physicians who violate
the most basic standards of professionalism and competency-for example, those
who cheat on their medical licensing exams, who use their positions of power to
abuse or take advantage of patients, or who repeatedly engage in practices that
violate the standard of medical care-than when they try to enforce aspirational
standards of conduct. That is, while medical boards may be able to justify most of
the disciplinary actions they take on constitutional grounds, there is little evidence
that boards have actually used constitutional standards to prioritize their exercise of
disciplinary discretion.
C. Explaining This Phenomenon
If medical boards are failing to achieve the public goals with which they have
been tasked, it is important to understand why this might be the case before
proposing any solutions. While at least one prominent legal scholar has explored
166. See Sawicki, supra note 165, at 33 (discussing the duty to treat in terms of morality rather than
legal obligation).
167. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955) (holding that
the measure must be a rational way of correcting a problem).
168. Edward Wong, Doctor Carved His Initials into a Patient, Lawsuit Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22,
2000, at B3.
169. Tamar Lewin, Accused as Molester, Pediatrician Ends Work, N.Y TIMES, Mar. 21, 2009, at A9.
170. Ansar v. State Med. Bd., No. 08AP-17, 2008 WL 2514818, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. June 24,
2008).
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the motivations of state bar examiners in investigating attorney character,'71 no
similar studies have been done of state medical boards. 172 Accordingly, there is
little consensus as to why medical boards choose to pursue discipline against
certain kinds of physician misconduct but not others. 73 That said, at least a few
potential explanations have been proposed.
According to a 2006 report prepared for the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, high costs and limited financial and human resources are among
the major obstacles to effective disciplinary enforcement by medical boards. 174
Because of these resource limitations, boards generally take a reactive rather than
proactive approach to medical discipline and are often unable to investigate all the
complaints that are made against physicians, necessarily triaging those of highest
priority while leaving others unexamined. 175 A recent empirical study seemed to
confirm this finding, noting a correlation between the extent of a board's financial
resources and its rate of discipline. 176 These reports suggest that increasing medical
boards' budgets would go a long way towards increasing the frequency of medical
discipline. Moreover, to the extent that boards choose to pursue certain substantive
categories of discipline rather than others on the basis of financial limitations-
relying on court reports to identify physicians who have been convicted of criminal
activity, for example, is likely to be less labor-intensive than actively investigating
physicians who provide medical care that consistently falls short of professional
standards177 -perhaps increasing board resources might have an impact on the
quality, not just the quantity, of professional discipline.
Another common explanation for medical boards' lax approach to
professional discipline is that the boards are "captured" by professional interests or
171. See Rhode, supra note 147, at 499-502 (determining that higher barriers for entry into the legal
profession arose in response to the influx of Eastern European immigrants during the 1920s and the
economic pressures of the 1930s).
172. One of the only recent studies that addresses similar themes in the medical context is
BOVBJERG ET AL., supra note 46.
173. See supra Part IL.A-B.
174. BOVBJERG ET AL., supra note 46, at 17, 38, 40-41; see also 1990 OIG REPORT, supra note 47,
at 7 ("Significant staff shortages continue to impede the [medical] boards' disciplinary efforts."); 1986
OIG REPORT, supra note 104, at 2 (finding that medical boards are in "an extremely vulnerable
position," and that they lack the funds to handle the jobs before them); Derbyshire, supra note 1, at 199
("[Alnother obstacle to self-discipline of the medical profession is lack of adequate resources.").
175. BOVBJERG ETAL.,supra note 46, at 21, 33, 35.
176. Law & Hansen, supra note 3, at 90; see also Andis Robeznieks, Am. MED. NEWS (Am. Med.
Ass'n), Nov. 11, 2002 (attributing a recent increase in New York medical board's disciplinary actions,
according to the Health Department spokeswoman, to a double in licensing fees).
177. See BOVBJERG ET AL., supra note 46, at 38 (finding that board managers and staff often pursue
grounds for discipline based on difficulty of investigation and prosecution); 1990 OIG REPORT, supra
note 47, at 10, 15 (noting that because quality of care inquiries tend to be time-consuming, "boards tend
to look for another basis to take action"); 1986 OIG REPORT, supra note 104, at 14 (stating that cases
involving incompetency are more difficult to develop than cases involving conviction for a felony or
fraud).
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otherwise lack meaningful public oversight. 178 Indeed, one of the most prominent
criticisms of the medical profession in the 20th century has been that it is self-
protective, monopolistic, and more attuned to the economic security of its members
than to the welfare of the public at large. 17 9 In the context of medical discipline,
some have argued that the boards' approaches to various substantive grounds for
discipline are likewise driven by internal constraints within the medical
community'80-for example, the push to improve the public standing of physicians
by emphasizing their moral superiority, which compared to their technical skill, is
much easier for laypersons to judge. While there can be no denying that the history
of American medicine is replete with examples of professional self-protection by
the AMA and other professional organizations,' 8' it is not clear that the problems
with medical discipline can be traced to a lack of public oversight.' 82 Indeed, many
studies suggest that boards that operate with greater statutory and structural
independence may in fact be more effective in disciplining physicians. 83 These
data have ultimately led some scholars to conclude that claims that "the medical
profession has captured the regulatory apparatus" have been "overstated."'
' 84
The issues described above-financial constraints, professional self-
protection, and lack of independence-are unlikely to be resolved without
significant political and professional buy-in. 8 5 However, the boards responsible for
178. BOVBJERG ET AL., supra note 46, at 45; Cohen, supra note 36, at 304; see also Derbyshire,
supra note 1, at 201 (discussing various attitudes toward licensing and disciplining of physicians).
179. See generally STARR, supra note 27, at 223 (discussing medicine's historical opposition to the
establishment of independent regulatory schemes for professionals such as midwives, chiropractors, and
osteopaths).
180. See Cohen, supra note 36, at 292 (noting the issue of bias and self-interest on licensing boards).
181. See, e.g., Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 895 F.2d 352, 378 (7th Cir. 1990) (upholding the district
court's conclusion that the AMA violated federal antitrust laws by conspiring to eliminate the
chiropractic profession); In re Am. Med. Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 701, 1014 (1979) (prohibiting medical
associations and state medical boards from enforcing their ethical guidelines regarding advertisement
and price fixing).
182. See Robeznieks, supra note 176 (noting that boards with higher numbers of public members do
not necessarily have higher rates of serious disciplinary action).
183. See, e.g., BOVBJERG ET AL., supra note 46, at 9 (finding independence from state medical
societies and other parts of government as a factor in allowing boards to run effective disciplinary
processes); 1990 OIG REPORT, supra note 37, at 8 (noting that limitations of boards' authority to
conduct cases and impose disciplinary actions impede their success); Law & Hansen, supra note 3, at 5
(finding that boards were more likely to take disciplinary action when they were more structurally
independent from state government; boards with a higher proportion of public (that is, non-professional)
members were found to be no more likely to engage in vigorous disciplinary enforcement); see also
Robeznieks, supra note 176 (noting that the Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana medical boards have
physician-only membership, and have "some of the most aggressive disciplinary rates").
184. Law & Hansen, supra note 3, at 5.
185. Increasing funding and structural independence, for example, would require strong support
from state legislatures and executives. Reducing the profession's self-protective instincts, on the other
hand, would take a significant amount of buy-in from the profession that is, quite frankly, unlikely to
happen. See Derbyshire, supra note 1, at 199 (stating that the laws probably will not completely solve
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professional discipline also face another significant challenge that can be more
easily resolved-namely, a lack of clear direction in setting disciplinary priorities.
Existing legal doctrine has neither adequately defined fitness to practice nor
resolved the question of why personal character is relevant to safe and effective
medical practice, so it is no wonder that boards face challenges in exercising their
disciplinary discretion in a principled manner.
As noted in Part I, legislatures grant medical boards disciplinary authority
pursuant to broadly worded medical practice acts authorizing discipline for, among
other things, "unprofessional conduct."'186 Although such language seems to
provide little guidance for medical boards engaged in concrete disciplinary
decisionmaking, courts have consistently upheld such broad categories of discipline
against challenges of vagueness and overbreadth, finding that they provide boards
with the flexibility and discretion necessary to effectuate public goals. 187 The
Washington Supreme Court, for example, upheld a statute authorizing professional
discipline for "moral turpitude" against a vagueness challenge, noting that when the
statute is "construed in relation to the purposes of professional discipline,
considered in the context of a specific application, and supplemented by the shared
knowledge and understanding of medical practitioners, its content is sufficiently
clear to put [practitioners] ... on notice that certain conduct is prohibited.'
' 88
And yet, most courts attempting to define fitness to practice or explain how a
particular category of professional misconduct relates to professional fitness are
able to offer little more than circular reasoning in support of their conclusions. As
noted by Deborah Rhode in her paradigmatic 1985 article on moral character as a
the problem of the curtain of silence and that the medical societies' have actively opposed any form of
regulation other than self-regulation).
186. See supra Part I.A.
187. As Justice Frankfurter wrote in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, the fact that the definition
of moral character "has shadowy rather than precise bounds" and its determination "involves an exercise
of delicate judgment" does not imply that a state may not require it as a condition of practice. 353 U.S.
232, 248-49 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). For state court decisions rejecting vagueness
challenges to professional discipline statutes, see, e.g., Abrahamson v. Dep't of Prof'l Regulation, 568
N.E.2d 1319, 1324 (III. App. Ct. 1991) ("good moral character"), rev'd on other grounds, 606 N.E.2d
1111 (111. 1992); Sanchick v. Mich. State Bd. of Exam'rs in Optometry, 70 N.W.2d 757, 759 (Mich.
1955) ("unprofessional, unethical and dishonest conduct of a character likely to deceive the public");
Ketring v. Sturges, 372 S.W.2d 104, 111 (Mo. 1963) ("dishonorable conduct"); Brody v. Barasch, 582
A.2d 132, 137 (Vt. 1990) ("moral unfitness"); Haley v. Med. Disciplinary Bd., 818 P.2d 1062, 1072-74
(Wash. 1991) ("moral turpitude").
188. Haley, 818 P.2d at 1074. The North Carolina Supreme Court acknowledged in In re Wilkins,
242 S.E.2d 829 (N.C. 1978), that there may be "room for difference of opinion" as to the outer edges of
the concepts of "unprofessional" or "dishonorable" conduct, but stated that "there is at and around the
central core of these concepts much conduct [that] so clearly constitutes improper practice that few, if
any, members of the profession would seriously claim to be unaware that such conduct is not consistent
with these concepts." Id. at 840. Rather than impose upon states the burden of cataloging "every
conceivable improper practice in which the licensee is forbidden to engage," the court held that
unprofessional conduct statutes be evaluated by reference to the test of "whether a reasonably intelligent
member of the profession would understand that the conduct in question is forbidden." Id. at 840-41.
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credential for the practice of law, what passes for legal analysis in these cases is
highly conclusory and "border[s] on tautology."' 189 Even Hawker v. New York, 190
the case that speaks most directly to the issue of character-related criteria for
professional licensure and discipline, offers little guidance. In Hawker, the
Supreme Court upheld a New York state law prohibiting the practice of medicine
by those who have been convicted of a felony, but provided little support for its
conclusion that personal "[c]haracter is as important a qualification as knowledge"
for professional practice and is therefore subject to discipline.' 9' In two brief
sentences, the Court offered the following meager explanation of its conclusion:
"The physician is one whose relations to life and health are of the most intimate
character. It is fitting, not merely that he should possess a knowledge of diseases
and their remedies, but also that he should be one who may safely be trusted to
apply those remedies."' 92 While these factors serve to emphasize the importance of
disciplining physicians compared to other professionals,' 93  they do not
satisfactorily explain why any particular grounds for discipline are appropriate.
Indeed, most state court decisions in disciplinary matters simply conclude that
moral character broadly defimed is a necessary component of fitness to practice
without providing adequate support for this assertion. 1
94
Substantive due process challenges to medical board disciplinary actions
taken on the basis of unprofessional conduct statutes have resulted in equally
189. Rhode, supra note 147, at 552.
190. 170 U.S. 189 (1898).
191. Id. at 189-90, 193-94. Because the Supreme Court decided Hawker decades before it
elucidated the fitness to practice requirement in Schware, 353 U.S. 232, the analysis in Hawker does not
lend itself to an easy discussion of the connection between personal character and fitness to practice
medicine.
192. Id. at 194; see also id. at 191 ("[No] business so directly affect[s] the lives and health of the
people as the practice of medicine."); In re Kindschi, 319 P.2d 824, 826 (Wash. 1958) ("The daily
practice of medicine concerns life and death consequences to members of the public.").
193. See Schware, 353 U.S. at 247 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). In his concurrence, Justice
Frankfurter wrote that because the legal profession is charged with the important responsibilities of
"defen[ding] ... right and ... ward[ing] off wrong," it is particularly important that members of the
profession have "a high sense of honor, [be] of granite discretion, [and have] ... the strictest observance
of fiduciary responsibility." Id.; see also In re Polk, 449 A.2d 7, 18 (N.J. 1982) (describing the less
stringent burden of proof in medical disciplinary proceedings compared to legal disciplinary proceedings
as reflecting "society's important interest in individual life and health").
194. See, e.g., Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1032 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Schware, 353 U.S.
232, and concluding that "[a] state may require good moral character as a qualification for entry into a
profession, when the practitioners of the profession come into close contact with patients or clients");
Foster v. Bd. of Med. Quality Assurance, 227 Cal. App. 3d 1606, 1610 (1991) (stating that a physician's
"intentional dishonesty" regarding his malpractice coverage "demonstrates a fundamental lack of moral
character [that] is incompatible with the honesty required to properly maintain the doctor-patient
relationship"); Raymond v. Bd. of Registration in Med., 443 N.E.2d 391, 395 (Mass. 1982) ("A
physician's bad moral character may reasonably call into question his ability to practice medicine.").
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unhelpful judicial analysis. 195 Consider, for example, In re Kindschi,196 a
Washington Supreme Court case that set the precedent for numerous cases
upholding medical discipline on character-related grounds.' 97 The court upheld a
medical board's decision to suspend the license of a physician who had committed
tax fraud, on the basis of a statute authorizing discipline for "unprofessional
conduct," including "conviction in any court of any offense involving moral
turpitude . . . ."'9' Finding "a rational connection between income tax fraud and
one's fitness of character or trustworthiness to practice medicine," the court held
that the board's discipline for tax fraud did not violate due process.' 99 In justifying
its decision on the grounds that "[t]he public has a right to expect the highest
degree of trustworthiness of the members of the medical profession," the
Washington Supreme Court effectively paved the way for professional discipline
against physicians who engage in any conduct suggesting untrustworthiness or
violating "sound standards of conduct .... ,,200
Of course, there are good reasons for legislatures to grant medical boards such
broad authority, as well as good reasons for courts to defer to board decisions,
provided they satisfy a reasonableness test. On the legislative side, given that
professional expectations are likely to evolve over time and across various
201
contexts, it would be problematic if unprofessional conduct statutes were drafted
to capture specific and defined instances of misconduct, rather than offer a
significant degree of flexibility. Moreover, granting medical boards broad
directives and allowing them to make judgments on their own without overly
stringent judicial review is consistent with the principles of professional discipline
that provide for physician-dominated boards as best suited to identify and enforce
professional standards.20 2 However, while such a deferential stance may be
195. See, e.g., Dittman, 191 F.3d at 1025, 1030-32 (failure to facilitate review of child support
obligations); Griffiths v. Super. Ct., 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 445, 448, 454 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (reckless
driving involving alcohol); Windham v. Bd. of Med. Quality Assurance, 163 Cal. Rptr. 566, 570-71
(Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (tax fraud); Weissbuch v. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 116 Cal. Rptr. 479, 481-82 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1974) (marijuana possession); McLaughlin v. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, Ill Cal. Rptr. 353, 354
(Cal. Ct. App. 1973) (soliciting sex); Deatherage v. State Exam'ing Bd. of Psychology, 948 P.2d 828,
830, 832 (Wash. 1997) (improper expert witness testimony); In re Kindschi, 319 P.2d at 825-26 (tax
fraud).
196. 319 P.2d 824.
197. See id. at 826-27 (finding a connection between tax fraud and fitness to practice medicine).
198. Id. at 825.
199. Id. at 826.
200. Id.
201. See John V. Jacobi, Competition Law's Role in Health Care Quality, I 1 ANNALS HEALTH L.
45, 45 (2002) (explaining that the American expectation for regulation of health care quality "survives
evolving attitudes regarding the proper balance of government, professional and market control of health
care delivery"); see also In re Polk, 449 A.2d 7, 19 (N.J. 1982) (discussing the impracticability of
requiring "the Legislature to catalogue and specify every act or course of conduct").
202. See supra Part I.B.
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appropriate as a matter of both law and policy, the meagerness of judicial
discussion in professional discipline cases makes it difficult for boards to derive
clear principles and guidelines for future action. By failing to provide a fuller
analysis in substantive due process cases, courts are missing a key opportunity to
explain to boards why the boundaries of constitutional action lie where they do.
Given the lack of guidance provided to boards by the legislatures in their
initial grant of disciplinary authority and by the courts in their judicial review of
disciplinary decisions, it is no wonder that the disciplinary actions taken by state
medical boards are sometimes inconsistent with the principles of professional
discipline. In the absence of legislative or judicial guidance, boards are free to take
action on these "noisy" cases based not on sound theories of discipline, but on the
pressures imposed by public officials, private interests, and the public, none of
which are necessarily the best drivers of administrative decisionmaking.
CONCLUSION
Accepting that medical boards' inability to appropriately prioritize their
disciplinary pursuits is due in part to a lack of guidance from legislatures and
courts, my hope is that this Article's inquiry into fundamental disciplinary
principles will be instructive. If they return their focus to the principles of public
protection, fitness to practice, and disciplinary minimalism, medical boards have
the potential to be a driving force in improving the quality of American medical
care.20 3 While boards will still be charged with making case-by-case
determinations, and will still have significant flexibility in exercising their
disciplinary discretion, there are some very real benefits to be gained by using a
principles-based analysis at every level of action-whether by legislators
determining grounds for professional discipline, medical boards reviewing
professional misconduct, or courts reviewing board disciplinary actions.
First, using principles-based analysis to reprioritize medical boards' actions
may free up boards' limited resources so they can focus less on character-related
misconduct and more on misconduct that is arguably more likely to harm patients
and the public-for example, gross incompetence, sexual assault of patients, and
repeated violations of the standard of the care. 2°4 Given that financial problems are
among the most significant systemic issues faced by modem medical boards,20 5
boards should take every effort to re-examine their disciplinary priorities and
determine whether there might be a better allocation of resources that would result
in more effective disciplinary enforcement. This would, in turn, help boards
203. See supra Part I.C.
204. See supra Parts I.C, lI.B.
205. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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respond to both the qualitative and quantitative criticisms of the approach they take
towards physician discipline. °6
Of course, critics may question whether eliminating the kinds of disciplinary
actions I deem most problematic-actions on the basis of unprofessional or
criminal misconduct with no direct link to patient safety or public health-is likely
to significantly increase the resources available for boards to deal with more
pressing cases. After all, many of these kinds of disciplinary actions are among the
least costly to pursue, especially as compared to actions relating to clinical
competency or quality of care.20 7 A criminal conviction against a licensed
physician, for example, is automatically reported by the court to the state board of
medicine; 2° 8 it then requires very little investigation on the part of the board to
conclude that a crime, in violation of the medical practice act, has actually
occurred.20 9 Internal or institutional sanctions imposed by hospitals are also
reported to state boards of medicine; 210 these cases generally require less
investigation at the board level because of the existing documentation at the
hospital level.2 ' Contrast this with disciplinary sanctions taken on the basis of
gross negligence, incompetence, or deviations from the standard of care-much
like civil malpractice suits, these kinds of actions require significant discovery and
investigation, and may take months or even years to conclude. 21 2 Given the board
resources required to successfully pursue discipline on quality of care grounds,
critics may suggest that it is indeed efficient (or, at worst, harmless) for boards to
focus on less resource-intensive disciplinary inquiries.
213
My response to this challenge is to point out that, while allocating boards'
financial resources more appropriately is one aspect of this project, it is hardly the
only one. The ultimate goal of professional discipline is to protect medical
consumers from harm. And while a medical board's ability to achieve this goal is
206. See supra text accompanying note 177.
207. See Jost et al., supra note 2, at 332 (discussing the requirements of pursuing action based on
allegations of clinical incompetence).
208. See id. at 310-11 (explaining that state boards initiate investigations based on information from
"reports and referrals" from outside sources).
209. See id. at 331 n.36, 337 (reporting that these complaints more often result in disciplinary
action).
210. Id. at 310-11.
211. See id. at 331 n.36, 337 (attributing the increased likelihood that these complaints will result in
disciplinary action to the fact that the problems are identified by trained professionals and are often
investigated prior to the filing of the complaint).
212. See FEBRUARY 1993 OIG REPORT, supra note 45, at I (discussing the significance of state
medical board quality-of-care cases); see also Jost et al., supra note 2, at 332 (describing the process of
pursuing actions based on clinical incompetence allegations).
213. E.g., Jost et al., supra note 2, at 335-36 ("[G]iven the resource constraints . . . and the
substantial commitment of resources required when formal action is taken,... informal action ... [may
be] a more rational strategy .... ").
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certainly driven in part by the resources it has at its disposal, other factors also
come into play.
Much like criminal law, professional discipline serves an important signaling
function for the medical community. It is the rare doctor who, in an effort to
understand the boundaries of permissible professional behavior, turns first to the
local law library to brush up on recent state legislation and case law. More likely,
he receives periodic disciplinary updates from his state medical board, reads about
cases of professional discipline in the media, and hears about the experiences of
colleagues and friends. Given that some of the most public and visible cases of
professional discipline deal with cases of misconduct that bear little connection to
the practice of medicine,214 I argue that modem medical boards that discipline on
character-related grounds may not be sending the most constructive signals to
physicians trying to conform their behavior to the law. Of course, we can imagine
215that some physicians are, like Al Capone, simply so dangerous to the community
that they must be removed from practice, even if the ultimate grounds for sanction
bear little or no relation to their dangerous conduct. But while this approach may be
necessary for the "Al Capones" of the medical profession, such cases are few and
far between.216 Regularly disciplining on grounds unrelated to quality of ca217 sets
a dangerous precedent, suggesting to physicians that the true indicators of
professionalism and competency are character-related.2t5
214. See supra Part II.A.
215. Though the primary charges against him alleged racketeering, Al Capone was ultimately
convicted on grounds of tax evasion. United States v. Capone, 93 F.2d 840, 840 (7th Cir. 1937).
216. Cf Robert E. Kessler, Time to Talk: Feds Catch Doctor Who Left LI Amid Poisoning Probe,
NEWSDAY (New York), July 25, 1997, at A03. After serving two years in prison for poisoning his co-
workers, Dr. Michael Swango lied about his criminal record in his application for another residency
position. Id. When officials learned about the lies Swango was fired from his hospital residency
position; despite concerns about potential poisonings, however, no charges were filed in connection with
those allegations. Id. Instead, a federal fraud charge for "obtaining federal money by making 'a false of
fictitious statement' was filed against Swango because it "was the easiest [charge] to bring in order to
arrest Swango .... " Id.
217. Recall the medical board director who said: "[W]e've never had a disciplinary action based on
malpractice.... [W]hen there is a malpractice case, we tend to look for another basis for disciplinary
action." 1986 OIG REPORT, supra note 104, at 14.
218. This issue hearkens back to the early days of medical licensing, when boards were criticized for
excluding practitioners who did not fit idealized (and self-serving) conceptions of professionalism. See
generally Gross, supra note 29, at 1009-11 (recounting the "historical antecedents" of exclusionary
professional licensing laws); Shirley Svorny & Eugenia Froedge Toma, Entry Barriers and Medical
Board Funding Autonomy, 97 PUB. CHOICE 93, 94 (1998) ("[S]tate medical boards [have historically]
maintained a variety of exclusionary rules .... "). Indeed, some scholars contend that medical boards
still unfairly discriminate against alternative practitioners not on quality of care grounds, but because
they do not fit traditional norms of professionalism. See Andrew K. Dolan & Nicole D. Urban, The
Determinants of the Effectiveness of Medical Disciplinary Boards: 1960-1977, 7 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
203, 206 (1983) ("[T]he boards may aggressively pursue mavericks within the profession [including]
those who disregard orthodox therapeutic notions or accepted economic forms of practice.").
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Using a principles-based approach will rid the disciplinary process of a
significant degree of uncertainty, better guiding physicians and increasing the
likelihood of consistency in outcomes over time. Currently, physicians are not
being put on notice as to what kind of conduct will subject them to discipline,
boards are not getting adequate guidance from the courts about the constitutional
limitations on professional discipline, and courts have very little principled
jurisprudence to look to in evaluating due process challenges.2" 9 Given the fact that
many state legislatures are currently moving to expand the scope of medical
boards' disciplinary authority in response to public concerns,22° it is particularly
important that this authority be exercised in a principled way. Using a principles-
based analysis, although it will not be outcome-determinative, will help determine
some categories of conduct that are relevant to disciplinary inquiries, and may
categorically exclude others-for example, many non-violent felonies. Moreover,
to the extent that boards have been criticized for taking an inconsistent approach to
medical discipline-imposing greater sanctions on providers who engage in tax
fraud than those who engage in Medicare fraud22 1-applying this kind of principled
analysis may help redeem them in the eyes of the public. It will set the stage for a
more consistent application of constitutional principles of due process in the
context of professional discipline, which will help to ensure that medical boards
exercise their disciplinary discretion in a manner that best serves the public interest.
Signaling functions aside, studying cases of professional discipline on the
basis of criminal conduct, personal character, and activities outside the clinical
sphere is likely to have a larger impact on our understanding of the role of
professional boards generally. 222 These "noisy" cases of discipline often test
constitutional boundaries and ultimately face judicial scrutiny, thus offering unique
opportunities for clarifying the boundaries of permissible board discipline. 223 The
lessons learned in these cases can then be used to provide guidance for professional
discipline in other contexts as well.
219. See supra Part II.B.
220. See generally Miriam Reisman, Role of Medical Board Discipline, PHYSICIAN'S NEWS DIGEST,
Feb. 2007, http://www.physiciansnews.com/cover/207pa.htm (discussing state efforts to reform boards'
disciplinary actions).
221. See Jung et al., supra note 118, at 349 tbl.3.
222. See supra Part 1I.
223. See supra Part I.
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